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Pleading for Theft Consolidation in Virginia:




Section 19.2-284 of the Virginia Code of Criminal Procedure' addresses
proof of property ownership in theft offenses.2 The statute provides:
In a prosecution for an offense committed upon, relating to or affecting real
estate, or for stealing, embezzling, destroying, injuring or fraudulently
receiving or concealing any personal estate it shall be sufficient to prove
that when the offense was committed the actual or constructive possession,
or a general or special property, in the whole or any part of such estate was
in the person or entity alleged in the indictment or other accusation to be
the owner thereof
Section 19.2-284 has remained virtually unchanged for a century and a half.4
Over that period, very few cases have relied on the statute or its predecessors,
and none have suggested that the statute might serve as a vehicle for the
consolidation of the theft crimes in Virginia. Yet, theft consolidation is
exactly what § 19.2-284 can achieve.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has always purported to treat the three
basic theft crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses as separate
and distinct offenses.5 Virginia maintains separate statutes for each crime.6
* The author would like to thank Professor Roger Groot for his guidance on this topic.
The author would also like to thank Patrick Bradshaw and Andrew Gottman for their editorial
work.
1. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-1 to -409 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998) (containing
Virginia's criminal procedure statutes).
2. See id. § 19.2-284 (discussing proof of ownership in theft offenses).
3. Id.
4. See VA. CODE, ch. 207, § 8 (1849) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284
(Michie 1995)) (illustrating almost no change between 1849 and 1995 versions).
5. See infra note 6 (listing each statute).
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie Supp. 1998) (defining grand larceny); VA.
CODEANN. § 18.2-96 (Michie 1996) (defining petit larceny); id. § 18.2-111 (defining embezzle-
ment); id. § 18.2-178 (defining false pretenses).
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However, over the past 130 years, court decisions and statutory amendments
have blurred the distinction among the theft offenses. Some older court cases
suggest a trend toward consolidation,7 while more recent decisions reaffirm
the distinctions! Likewise, some older versions of Virginia's theft statutes
codified rules that caused the crimes to overlap.9 These rules are now absent
from the current version of Virginia law."'
These conflicting authorities create ambiguity in Virginia's body of theft
law. Some jurists assert that the theft crimes overlap;" others view them as
separate and distinct.'2 Section 19.2-284 may resolve these inconsistencies.
This statute eliminates- if not completely, at least substantially-the elements
that distinguish larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses from one another.
The end result is most likely the effectual consolidation of larceny, embezzle-
ment, and false pretenses. Thus, § 19.2-284 brings Virginia into conformity
with the majority of American jurisdictions, which have already consolidated
these crimes. 3
Part II of this Note provides the general background of Virginia's theft
statutes and the circumstances giving rise to the suggestion that § 19.2-284 is
a consolidation vehicle. 4 Parts III through V analyze the relationship between
§ 19.2-284 and larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. Part I traces the
historical development of larceny and contends that § 19.2-284 is consistent
with Virginia's interpretation of common law larceny." Part IV describes the
7. See Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth, 22 S.E. 351, 352 (Va. 1895) (noting that proof of
embezzlement will sustain larceny indictment); Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.)
563, 566 (1873) (noting that proof of false pretenses will support larceny indictment).
8. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (Va. 1983) (refusing to allow
proof of larceny by trick to support false pretenses conviction); Cera v. Commonwealth, No.
0432-94-4,1995 WL 250816, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. May2, 1995) (notingthat "embezzlement and
larceny are separate offenses with different elements").
9. See.VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1982) (amended 1994) (noting that Common-
wealth deems embezzler guilty of larceny and may indict embezzler for larceny and that proof
of embezzlement will support larceny indictment).
10. SeeVA.CoDEANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996)(lackingrulessuggestingtrendtowards
consolidation).
11. See, e.g., Pitsnogle, 22 S.E. at 352 (noting that proof of embezzlement will support
larceny indictment); Anable, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) at 566 (noting that proof of false pretenses will
support larceny indictment); Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687, 690-92 (Va. Ct.
App. 1995) (expanding embezzlement to cover what would have been common law larceny).
12. See Baker, 300 S.E.2d at 789 (refusing to allow proof of larceny by trick to support
false pretenses conviction); Cera, 1995 WL 250816, at *2 (noting that larceny and embezzle-
ment are distinct offenses).
13. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (listing states with unitary theft statutes).
14. See infra notes 21-59 and accompanying text (providing summary background).
15. See infra notes 60-129 and accompanying text (arguing that § 19.2-284 is consistent
with Virginia's common law definition of larceny).
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origin and development of embezzlement. 6 This Part highlights the elements
that distinguish embezzlement from larceny and concludes that § 19.2-284
sufficiently blurs these elements to the point that embezzlement and larceny
merge. 7 Similarly, Part V discusses the evolution of false pretenses and the
characteristics that distinguish it from larceny by trick.' Part V contends that
larceny and false pretenses merge in all but one circumstance.' 9 Part VI
synthesizes the foregoing analysis and concludes that § 19.2-284 completes
the consolidation of the three basic offenses against property.2°
II. Background
Throughout history, larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses have
converged several times.2' The element of possession inherent in common
law larceny has often become so ambiguous that it threatens to blur the
distinctions among the three crimes.' Tracking this evolutionary process,
most American states now have unitary theft statutes that consolidate, at a
minimum, the three basic theft crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false
pretenses.23
16. See infranotes 130-223 and accompanying text (providing historical developmentof
embezzlement).
17. See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text (contending that § 19.2-284 consoli-
dates larceny and embezzlement).
18. See infra notes 224-331 and accompanying text (tracing development of false
pretenses).
19. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text (arguing that § 19.2-284 consolidates
false pretenses and larceny).
20. See infra notes332-46 and accompanying text (concluding that § 19.2-284 completes
consolidation of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses).
21. See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCImrY 35 (2d ed. 1952) (noting convergence
of theft crimes).
22. See id. ("At times the concept of 'possession' as used in the traditional definition of
larceny becomes so fine-spun that it threatens to obliterate entirely the distinctions between the
three crimes.").
23. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-1 to -23 (1994) (consolidating theft offenses); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.46. I00 to.295 (Michie 1996) (same); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1801 to-1810
(West 1989) (same); ARK. CODEANN. §§ 5-36-101 to -397 (Michie 1997) (same); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18-4-401 to 416 (West 1997) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-I 18 to
-125b (West 1994) (same); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, §§ 840-859 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (same);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 812.005 to.176 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (same); GA. CODEANN. §§ 16-
8-1 to -86 (1996 & Supp. 1997) (same); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 708-830 to -858 (1993 & Supp.
1996) (same); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-1 to 5/16A-10 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997)
(same); IND. CODEANN. §§ 35-43-4-1 to -6 (Michie 1994) (same); IOWA CODEANN. §§ 714.1
to .25 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3701 to -3704 (1995) (same);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.010 to .150 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996) (same); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14:67 (West 1997) (same); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 351-362 (West 1983 &
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Virginia is not among that majority. The Commonwealth maintains
separate offenses for each of the three basic theft crimes.24 Larceny retains its
common law definition. The larceny statutes discuss only the grading of the
offenses.' Neither the grand larceny nor the petit larceny sections explain the
elements of the actual offense;26 rather, courts have performed this task.27 In
Supp. 1997) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.52 to .551 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997) (same);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.010 to .220 (West 1979 & Supp. 1998) (same); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-6-301 to -319 (1997) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-510 to -518 (1995) (same); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 637:1 to :11 (1996) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-1 to -37 (West 1995
& Supp. 1998) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00 to .45 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998)
(same); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-23-01 to -10 (1997) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2913.01 to .82 (West 1997 & Supp. 1997) (same); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.005 to .140
(1997) (same); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3901-3923 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998) (same);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-30A-1 to -21 (Michie 1998) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 31.01 to .11 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-401 to -412
(1995 & Supp. 1998) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.56.010 to .270 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1998) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.20 to .62 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (same);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-401 to -410 (Michie 1997) (same).
24. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie Supp. 1998) (describing penalty for common
law grand larceny); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (defining embezzlement); id.
§ 18.2-178 (defining false pretenses).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie Supp. 1998). This section provides only for
punishment:
Any person who (i) commits larceny from the person of another of money or
other thing of value of $5 or more, (ii) commits simple larceny not from the person
of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more, (iii) commits
simple larceny not from the person of another of any firearm, regardless of the
firearm's value, shall be guilty of grand larceny, punishable by imprisonment in
a state correctional facility for not less than one nor more than twenty years or, in
the discretion of the jury or court trying the case without ajury, be confined in jail
for a period not exceeding twelve months or fined not more than $2,500, either or
both.
Id. Similarly, § 18.2-96 merely setsthepunishmentforpetitlarceny. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-96
(Michie 1996). Section 18.2-96 states:
Any person who:
1. Commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of
value of less than $5, or
2. Commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and
chattels of the value of less than $200, except as provided in subdivision (iii) of
§ 18.2-95, shall be guilty of petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a Class I
misdemeanor.
Id.
26. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-95 to -96 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998) (discussing
penalties for larceny conviction but failing to outline elements of larceny).
27. See Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 35 S.E.2d 763,764 (Va. 1945) (defining elements
of larceny).
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contrast, embezzlement 8 and false pretenses29 are statutory in nature, and the
statutes clearly define the elements of the crimes."
Nonetheless, as theft crimes, the three offenses remain closely related.
For example, embezzlement and false pretenses carry the same punishment as
larceny." This suggests that no moral difference exists among the offenses. 2
However, if larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses survive in Virginia as
separate offenses, the technical distinctions among them must remain. Juris-
dictions that continue to employ separate theft offenses are susceptible to
failed prosecutions even though proof at trial establishes that the accused
committed a related offense.3 As a result, prosecutors must be extremely
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996). This section provides:
If any person wrongfully and fraudulently use, dispose of, conceal or embezzle any
money, bill, note, check, order, draft, bond, receipt, bill of lading or any other
personal property, tangible or intangible, which he shall have received for another
or for his employer, principal or bailor, or by virtue of his office, trust, or employ-
ment, or which shall have been entrusted or delivered to him by another or by any
court, corporation or company, he shall be guilty of embezzlement. Embezzlement
shall be deemed larceny and upon conviction thereof, the person shall be punished
as provided in § 18.2-95 or § 18.2-96.
Id.
29. Id. § 18.2-178. The false pretenses statute provides:
If any person obtain, by any false pretense or token, from any person, with intent
to defraud, money or other property which may be the subject of larceny, he shall
be deemed guilty of larceny thereof; or if he obtain, by any false pretense or token,
with such intent, the signature of any person to a writing, the false making whereof
would be forgery, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
Id.
30. See id. § 18.2-111 (defining embezzlement); id. § 18.2-178 (definingfalsepretenses).
31. See id. § 18.2-111 (providing that embezzlement carries same punishment as larceny);
id. § 18.2-178 (noting that Commonwealth deems false pretenses to be larceny).
32. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 8.8(a)(2), at 412 (1986). LaFave and Scott state: "The fact that the statutory punishment is
almost always the same for false pretenses and embezzlement as it is for larceny supports the
notion that there is no moral difference between the activities of the thief, the embezzler and the
swindler." Id. LaFave and Scott also note that "it can hardly make a difference to the victim
whether he loses his property by another's stealth, or by his fraudulent conversion or through
his falsehoods." Id.; see also Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 146 N.E. 432,433
(N.Y. 1925) (noting no moral difference among theft crimes). Justice Cardozo, writing for the
court in Van Vechten, noted: "The distinction, now largely obsolete, did not ever correspond
to any essential difference in the character of the acts or in their effect upon the victim. The
crimes are one to-day in the common speech of men as they are in moral quality." Id.
33. See MODELPENALCODE § 223.1 cmt. on consolidation oftheftoffenses at 133 (1980)
(noting that defense that accused actually acquired property by different wrongful method often
defeats charges based on one method of wrongfully obtaining property). A comment to the
Model Penal Code states:
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 249 (1999)
wary and specific as to what offense they allege and what they may ultimately
prove. As one of the jurisdictions that chooses to preserve the trinity of basic
theft offenses, Virginia must require precision in its prosecutions. Although
occasionally problematic, the system of technical precision has at least ap-
peared clear.
However, a recent Virginia Court of Appeals decision threatens to alter
fundamentally this entire system." In Catterton v. Commonwealth,35 the
defendant appealed a bench trial conviction for the larceny of a motor vehicle
in violation of Virginia's grand larceny statute. 6 The indictment against
Catterton alleged that he "did unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal, and
carry away a 1986 Ford Bronco... belonging to Debora Brooke, with the
intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof."37
Debora Brooke, the true owner of the Bronco, took the vehicle to a
mechanic for repair work. 8 When she returned to claim the car, her Bronco
was missing." Law enforcement officers later pursued the Bronco in conjunc-
tion with a hit-and-run accident and apprehended Catterton as he fled from the
vehicle.4" The Commonwealth tried and convicted Catterton for grand lar-
ceny.4' On appeal, Catterton contended, consistent with the traditional com-
mon law approach, that when Ms. Brooke left her Bronco at the repair shop,
the mechanic, as bailee, became the "owner" of the car for the purpose of
The real problem arises from a defendant's claim that he did not misappropriate the
property bythemeans allegedbut infactmisappropriated the property by some other
means and from the combination of such claim with the procedural rule that a
defendant who is charged with one offense cannot be convicted by proving another.
Id.
34. See Catterton v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 748, 749-50 (Va. Ct. App. 1996)
(affirming larceny convictionwhen defendant allegedly misappropriated automobile from repair
shop, but indictment charged misappropriation from true owner).
35. 477 S.E.2d 748 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
36. Catterton v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 748,749 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); see VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie Supp. 1998) In Catterton, the victim took her automobile to a
mechanic's shop for repairs. Catterton; 477 S.E.2d at 749. Catterton allegedly stole the vehicle
from the mechanie/bailee. Id. However, the indictment charged that Catterton stole the vehicle
from the true owner. Id. At trial, the mechanic did not testify. Id. The Commonwealth subse-
quently convicted Catterton of larceny from the true owner of the vehicle. Id. On appeal,
Catterton contended that the mechanic/bailee, not the true owner, was the owner of the vehicle
for the purposes ofproving larceny. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, finding that "[o]wner-
ship for purposes of proving larceny may belong either to the true owner or to the owner's
bailee." Id. at 750.
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proving larceny.42 Traditional common law larceny is a crime against posses-
sion.43 In this case, the mechanic/bailee was in possession." Thus, if a
larceny occurred, Catterton argued that it was from the mechanic and not the
true owner of the vehicle.45 Though Catterton may have committed some
wrongful act, the Commonwealth alleged an offense that he did not commit.
A three-judge panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals decided the matter
differently.46 The panel found that:
When Ms. Brooke took her vehicle to the repair shop, she relinquished
possession to the repair shop only for the special purpose of fixing her
brakes. She retained both her ownership and her right to reclaim posses-
sion. Ownership for purposes of proving larceny may belong either to the
true owner or to the owner's bailee.47
In reaching this conclusion, the court resurrected Latham v. Commonwealth,4S
a 1946 Virginia Supreme Court decision that ruled that in order "[to sustain
an indictment for larceny it is only necessary to prove that the goods alleged
to have been stolen are either the 'absolute or the special property of the
alleged owner."'49 The court in Latham believed that such a rule was consis-
42. Id.
43. See ROGERD. GROOT, CRMIINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES iN VIRGrNIA 334 (4th ed.
1998) ("Common law larceny was a crime against possession rather than ownership."); 2
LAFAVE & Scoar, supra note 32, § 8.1(a), at 328 (noting elementary requirement ofpossession
for larceny conviction); RoLLINM. PERKINs, CRIMINALLAW 238 (2d ed. 1969) ("Larceny is an
offense against possession.").
44. Catterton v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 748, 749 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
45. See id (noting Catterton's contention that mechanie/bailee was "owner").
46. See id. (noting that court disagreed with Catterton's contention that mechanic/bailee
was "owner").
47. Id. at 749-50.
48. 37 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1946).
49. Latham v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 36, 38 (Va. 1946) (quoting 2 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EvDENCE § 1070, at 1879-80 (1 Ith ed. 1935)). Wharton states that:
To sustain an indictment for larceny or for similar offenses in which the gist and
essence of the crime charged is the taking and carrying away of the personal goods
of another without the consent of the owner, it is sufficient that the goods alleged
to have been stolen are proved to be either the absolute or the special property of
the alleged owner. Hence, the allegation of ownership of stolen property is sus-
tained by the proof of any legal interest or special ownership which may be less
than absolute title to the property.
2 WHARTON'S, supra, § 1070, at 1879-80.
In Latham, the Commonwealth indicted the defendant for the larceny (receiving stolen
goods) of three cases of cigars. Latham, 37 S.E.2d at 37. The El Producto Cigar Company
delivered the cases to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for shipment. Id. Upon arrival in
Norfolk, Virginia, the cases of cigars passed to the Norfolk and Western Railway Company.
Id. Subsequent inspection of the boxcar that contained the cases revealed that the cigars were
missing. Id. Investigation led the police to Latham's store where they discovered the three
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tent with what was at the time Code of Virginia § 4872."0 This statute sur-
vives today as § 19.2-284."I The Latham court, focusing on the element of
special property, supplemented § 4872 with the general rule of special owner-
ship "that where chattels are taken feloniously from any bailee or other special
owner... the ownership may be laid either in such possessor or the real
owner, at the election of the pleader."'52 These two rules suggest a consolida-
tion at least in the sense that larceny may be more than merely a crime against
the prior possessor- a startling suggestion indeed. However, in the fifty years
between this decision and Catterton, no Virginia court has relied on Latham.3
cases of cigars. Id. at 37-38. The police found that "[a]ll three cases had been broken open and
cigars taken therefrom." Id. at 38. The Commonwealth indicted and convicted Latham of
larceny. Id. at 37. Latham contended that the verdict was in error because the cigars were not
the property of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and were not in its possession at the time
of the alleged taking. Id. at 38. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 39.
In so doing, the court relied on Code of Virginia § 4872, which provides: "In a prosecution
for... stealing... or fraudulently receiving... any personal estate, it shall be sufficient to
prove that, when the offense was committed, the actual or constructive possession, or a general
or special property ... was in the person or community alleged in the indictment... to be the
owner thereof." Id. at 38 (citing VA. CoDE ANN. § 4872 (Michie 1942) (current version at VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995))).
50. Latham, 37 S.E.2d at 38.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995). This statute provides:
In a prosecution for an offense committed upon, relating to or affecting real estate,
or for stealing, embezzling, destroying, injuring or fraudulently receiving or
concealing any personal estate it shall be sufficient to prove that when the offense
was committed the actual or constructive possession, or a general or special prop-
erty, in the whole or any part of such estate was in the person or entity alleged in
the indictment or other accusation to be the owner thereof.
Id.
52. See Latham, 37 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting 2 JOEL PRENTSS BISHOP, BISHOP'S NEW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 721, at 326-27 (4th ed. 1896)). Bishop also states that in cases in
which there is both a general and special owner, "the rule is nearly universal that the pleader
may charge the goods belonging to either, though often the convenience of making proof will
suggest practical grounds for choice." 2 BISHOP, supra, § 720, at 326.
53. Cf Richardsonv. Maryland, 156A.2d 436,438 (Md. 1959)(citingLatham,37S.E.2d
36). Only the Maryland Court of Appeals in Richardson v. Maryland has followed Latham's
reasoning. In Richardson, a larceny case, the State alleged that the ownership of the property
stolen was in Horn's Motor Express, Inc. Id. at 437. The "property alleged to have been stolen
had been delivered by the Shoe Company to Horn's, through whom it shipped all of its merchan-
dise, to be transported to a customer in Georgia; and the property was stolen from one of Horn's
sealed trailers." Id. at 438. Defendant assigned error contending that the State had proved that
the ownership was actually in Pleasant Valley Shoe Company. Id. at 437. The court found:
It is generally held that in a prosecution for larceny, an allegation of the ownership
of stolen goods is supported by proof of any legal interest or special property in the
goods, as, for instance, where the person named in the indictment is in lawful
possession as a bailee or common carrier.
Id. at 438.
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Similarly, few cases have relied on § 19.2-284."'
The reasons for the lack of attention to § 19.2-284 among courts and
scholars are unclear. It is quite possible that Virginia's legal community has
yet to realize the potential of § 19.2-284 to alter the current system. The fact
that Virginia maintains the formal distinctions among larceny, embezzlement,
and false pretenses when other states have consolidated these offenses bolsters
the suggestion that the Commonwealth is unaware of this possible mechanism
for consolidation. The span of fifty years between Latham and Catterton is
significant. During that period, the Commonwealth resorted to § 19.2-284
only to affirm the rare case in which proof of the possession/ownership
element of the offense alleged differed slightly from the indictment.5
Even before Latham, the courts made little mention of this mysterious
procedure statute. However, as early as 1867, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals did attempt to clarify the meaning of the statute.56 After citing
54. Cf Tammaro v. Commonwealth, No. 0504-94-1, 1995 WL 117900, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Mar. 21, 1995) (citing VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995)). The one exception is
Tammaro v. Commonwealth, a 1995 unpublished disposition involving the destruction of
property, not larceny. kL Tammaro involved the concept of constructive possession. Id. The
court stated:
Although the indictment described the woman named in the indictment as the
owner of the automobile which the defendant damaged, she did not have legal title
to the property. However, the evidence demonstrated that the woman had posses-
sion of the automobile and that she was to receive title to it under an agreement
with her former husband, who did have legal title to the property. Proof that the
person alleged in the indictment to be the owner of such property has actual or
constructive possession of the property is sufficient in a prosecution for this
offense.
Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995)).
55. See Cattertonv. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 748, 750 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming
larceny conviction in bailment context when evidence showed possessionto be in mechanic and
not in true owner); Tammaro, 1995 WL 117900, at *1 (affirming destruction of property
conviction when evidence showed ownership of property destroyed to be in one who did not
have legal title).
56. See Hughes v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 565, 567 (1867) (expounding on
meaning of statute). In Hughes, the Commonwealth indicted a freedwoman for the larceny of
several articles of woman's clothes, said to be the property of one Mrs. Robert H. Montague.
Id. at 565. The evidence appearing at trial showed that Mrs. Montague was a married woman.
Id. Under the common law, the Commonwealth could not allege, in an indictment for larceny,
a married woman to be the owner of stolen property. Id. at 566. The court noted that
"[h]usband and wife are in law one person. Her legal entity is merged in his; and in all legal
proceedings, criminal or civil, he is regarded as the owner of property in her possession (if it
not belong to a third person), even though it be her wearing apparel." Id. Hughes moved the
court to instruct thejury that if it believed Mrs. Montague to be amarried woman, it should find
Hughes not guilty. Id. at 565. The court did not give the instruction, and the jury convicted
Hughes. Id. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 569.
The court found that even in the face of the code, the person alleged to have owned the stolen
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chapter 207, § 8, the nineteenth century version of § 19.2-284, the court
noted:
This statute was not intended to dispense, and does not dispense with the
necessity of stating in an indictment for larceny the name of the owner of
the property stolen, norto enable any person to be such owner who was not
capable of being so at common law. Its only object was to get rid of the
difficulties which often existed at common law in regard to the proper
person to be stated as the owner of the property in an indictment for lar-
ceny or other offences against property.... But the person named in the
indictment as owner of the property must still, under the statute, as under
the common law, be a person competent in law to be such owner.5"
Despite what appears to be an invitation to push for theft consolidation, no
one has suggested that the Commonwealth could use § 19.2-284 as a tool in
this process, which would greatly simplify the task of alleging and proving
such offenses. Even Catterton did not contemplate this premise. Surpris-
ingly, Catterton did not even directly rely on § 19.2-284."9
Nonetheless, the ramifications of Catterton may blur the distinctions
among the three basic theft crimes to the point that the Commonwealth
emerges with a unitary working definition of theft. The result may be a
judicial consolidation of the theft crimes. If so, consolidation via § 19.2-284
demonstrates a unique backdoor and unconscious approach to remedying the
problems inherent in a separate offense jurisdiction and hints of an evolution-
ary process rather than a conscious legislative effort to consolidate. This Note
considers whether consolidation of the theft offenses is a probable result in the
wake of Catterton and the rediscovery of § 19.2-284.
III Larceny and § 19.2-284
Larceny is a common law crime.6" Authorities describe the offense in
several ways, but in general, larceny is the "(1) trespassory (2) taking and
(3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5) of another (6) with intent to
property must have been a person capable of owning such property at common law. Id. at 567.
Mrs. Montague, as a married woman, was incapable of ownership of the stolen property. Id.
at 566. Therefore, the court concluded, the lower court should have given an instruction
requiring the jury to acquit if it believed Mrs. Montague to be married. Id. at 568.
57. See VA. CODE, cl. 207, § 8 (1849) (stating language almost identical to § 19.2-284).
58. Hughes, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) at 567.
59. See Catterton, 477 S.E.2d at 750 (relying solely on Latham v. Commonwealth, 37
S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1946), as authority for rule).
60. See 2 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 32, § 8.1(a), at 328 (noting that larceny is "a
common-law crime (invented by the English judges rather than by Parliament) committed when
one person misappropriated another's property by means of taking it from his possession
without his consent").
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steal it."'" Some states have adopted statutes defining larceny, while others
make use of definitions that are merely declarative of the common law.62
Virginia retains a common law definition of larceny.' The statutory sections
for grand and petit larceny" do not define the crime; they merely determine the
punishments." Virginia case law provides the definition of the elements of
larceny. Dunlavey v. Commonwealth' defines larceny as "the wrongful or
fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to
another, without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof
permanently."67 Even the most recent larceny cases employ this definition.68
61. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTiN W. ScoTr, JR., CRuINAL LAW 706 (2d ed. 1986); see
PERKINS, supra note 43, at 234 ("Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the
personal property of another with intentto steal the same."); 3 CHARLEs E.ToRciA, WHARTON'S
CRM NAL LAW § 342, at 347 (15th ed. 1995) ("At common law, larceny is the trespassory
taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent permanently to
deprive."); cf. 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(1) (1968) (providing common law definition of larceny).
The C.J.S. defines common law larceny as
the taking and carrying away from any place, at any time, of the personal property
of another, without his consent, by a person not entitled to the possession thereof,
feloniously, with intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently, and to
convert it to the use of the taker or of some person other than the owner.
Id.
62. See Larceny, supra note 61, § 1(3)(a) (discussing statutory larceny).
63. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 330 (citing Smith v. Cox, 435 F.2d 453, 457 (4th Cir.
1970), vacatedsub nom. Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971)) (noting that larceny retains its
common law definition).
64. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Michie Supp. 1998) (discussing grand larceny); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-96 (Michie 1996) (discussing petit larceny).
65. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 330 (noting that "[s]ections 18.2-95 and 18.2-96 divide
larceny into degrees and set penalties, but do not define the crime").
66. 35 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1945).
67. Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (Va. 1945) (citing Vaughn v.
Lytton, 101 S.E. 865, 867(Va. 1920)). InDunlavey, the Commonwealth indicted the defendant
for the larceny of an automobile. Id. at 763. Louis Hall and Raymond White had stolen an
automobile. Id. Three days later, defendant Dunlavey agreed to push the stolen automobile
with his car in order to start the stolen vehicle. Id. at 763-64. Dunlavey had also agreed to buy
certain parts from the stolen car. Id. at 764. After the stolen car started, those involved in the
theft drove the car to a park three miles distant. Id. Dunlavey followed in his vehicle. Id.
While the men were in the park, a park policeman discovered them. Id. Hall, White, and an
unidentified person fled the scene. Id. Dunlavey remained, and the policeman took him into
custody. Id. The police found parts from the stolen automobile in Dunlavey's automobile. Id.
Following a conviction for larceny, Dunlavey contended on appeal that based on this evidence
the Commonwealth could not convict him of larceny, but only of knowingly receiving stolen
goods. Id. However, the court found that the "crime here consisted of moving the automobile
by the accused in order to get it started and not in receiving the parts taken from it." Id. at 765.
Moreover, larceny is a continuous offense. Id. Dunlavey's acts were part of one continuous
transaction; therefore, the court found him guilty of larceny. Id. at 765-66.
68. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 486 S.E.2d 126, 130 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (defining
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There are two basic forms of larceny in Virginia: (1) larceny by stealth
and (2) larceny by trick.69 Larceny by stealth ("larceny") simply refers to the
original version of the common law offense' and occurs when one person
intentionally misappropriates property from the possession of another without
the prior possessor's consent.71 In other words, larceny involves atrespassory
taking.72
Originally, common law larceny, as a crime against possession, could not
account for all cases ofmisappropriated property, especially when it appeared
that the thief lawfully possessed the allegedly stolen property.73 One such
situation was a case in which the thief obtained possession of the property
with the consent of the owner by telling lies, all the while intending to ab-
scond with that property.74 Because the owner/prior possessor had voluntarily
given the property to the wrongdoer, it was difficult to find a breach of
possession.75 The law eventually assimilated such conduct into larceny as
larceny by trick.76
larceny as "the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic value,
belonging to another, without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof
permanently" (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Va. Ct. App. 1986))).
69. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 330 (noting two types of larceny in Virginia).
70. See JOHN B. MINOR, MINOR ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 98-99 (1894) (providing
Virginia's definition of common law larceny). Larceny in Virginia is as follows: "(1), A
wrongful or fraudulent taking-, (2), Of personal goods of some intrinsic value; (3), Belonging
to another; (4), Without the owner's assent; (5), With the intention to deprive the owner thereof
permanently." Id.
71. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 330 (noting that larceny "occurred when [a] thief inter-
rupted the possession of the prior possessor without his consent"); 2 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra
note 32, § 8.1(a), at 328 (noting that larceny occurred "when one person misappropriated
another's property by means of taking it from his possession without his consent").
72. See MINOR, supra note 70, at 99 (discussing element of taking). Minor states:
The taking, which is the first element of larceny, is the getting possession of the
thing by seizure or bodily act, such as constitutes a trespass, not merely touching
or handling it. There must be a severance from the actual or constructive posses-
sion of the owner. Hence, taking includes the exportation or carrying away, which
is satisfied by the least removal. Hence, also, taking excludes the idea of the
owner's consent, and thus leads to the distinction between embezzlement, or breach
of trust, where possession is voluntarily yielded by the owner; and larceny, where
it is taken.
Id. (citations omitted).
73. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 32, § 8.1(a), at 328 (describing situations
originally beyond scope of common law larceny).
74. See id. § 8.1(a), at 330 (describing situations originally beyond scope of common law
larceny).
75. See id. (noting such case to be inconsistent with common law larceny).
76. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 330 (noting assimilation of such conduct into concept
of larceny).
260
PLEADING FOR THEFT CONSOLIDATION IN VIRGINIA
Unlike other developments in the law of theft, larceny by trick did not
originate by statute.' It is entirely attributable to The King v. Pear (Pear's
Case),7  decided in 1779."9 In that case, Pear hired a horse with the intent to
sell it and to flee with the proceeds."0 It appeared that because Pear had the
owner's consent to possess the horse, he had not committed larceny. How-
ever, the court found that the acquisition of consent by a false promise consti-
tuted a breach of possession." This result stemmed from the theory that
consent obtained by fraud did not equal true consent.8 2 Thus, larceny by trick
emerged. Virginia incorporates larceny by trick into its common law defini-
tion through the use of the word "fraudulent."83
77. See HALL, supranote2l,at4l (notingthat "[liarceny by trickwas not, like most other
major eighteenth century developments in the law of theft, the product of legislative enact-
ment").
78. 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (Old Bailey 1779).
79. See HALL, supra note 21, at41 (noting that larceny by trick "may, in fact, be attributed
entirely to Pear's Case, decided in 1779"); see also The King v. Pear (Pear's Case), 168 Eng.
Rep. 208, 209 (Old Bailey 1779) (giving rise to larceny by trick). In this case, Pear hired a
horse from a livery-stable-keeper to go to Sutton and back again. d. However, instead of
returning, Pear sold the horse on the very day he hired it. Id. at 208-09. The court instructed
the jury that the case hinged on when Pear formed the intent to steal the horse. Id. at 209. If
the jury believed Pear formed the intent to sell the horse at the time he rented it, then the jury
should acquit Pear. Id. However, if the jury found that Pear formed the intent to sell prior to
hiring the horse, the jury should find that fact specifically for the opinion of thejudges. Id. The
jury found that Pear "had hired the horse with a fraudulent view and intention of selling it
immediately." Id. The judges then found the prisoner guilty of felony. Id.
80. Pear's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. at 208.
81. Id. at 209. The court found that "the parting with the property had not changed the
nature of the possession, but that it remained unaltered in the prosecutor at the time of the
conversion; and that the prisoner was therefore guilty of felony." Id. Some authorities interpret
this to mean that the breach of possession did not occur until Pear actually sold the horse. See
2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 32, § 8.1 (a)(3), at 330 (noting that majority ofjudges in Pear's
Case indulged fiction "that the owner of the mare retained possession until the time of its sale
by the defendant"). Other authorities take the view that the fraud vitiated the consent and, thus,
the breach of possession occurred at the moment Pear took the horse from the true owner. See
PERKINS, supra note 43, at 246. Perkins states:
[I]f one, who intends to appropriate another's horse permanently to his own use,
fraudulently pretends that he merely wishes to borrow it for the afternoon, and by
this fraudulent representation receives the owner's consent to ride away on the
horse, this is a trespassory taking despite the consent, because "fraud vitiates the
transaction," and such a taking is larceny.
Id. (footnote omitted).
82. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 330 (stating court's theory that "consent obtained by
fraud" was not true consent).
83. See id. (noting that "Virginia definition, by use of the word 'fraudulent' has adopted
this doctrine and often applied it").
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Traditionally, common law larcenyhas been a crime against possession."
Although this premise seems quite simple, some situations involve very fine
distinctions. Suppose a Master gives her Servant property to use or keep for
the Master. It would seem that while the Servant holds the property, the
Servant has possession. 5 However, in this situation, the Servant merely has
custody of the property; the Master retains constructive possession.86 As a
general rule, if a person receives property for only a limited or temporary
purpose, that person acquires custody rather than possession. 7 An important
result of this legal fiction is that the wrongdoer who misappropriates chattels
in his/her custody may be guilty of larceny.88
Nonetheless, the distinction between custody and possession is not
always as clear as in the previous example. In some cases, servants, in whom
a master places an unusual element of trust, have possession. 9 The following
example illustrates this subtle distinction. Suppose S operates a cash register
in a grocery store. At the beginning of her shift, M (the owner of the store)
gives S a till containing $200. Because of her position of trust, S is in posses-
sion of this money.' IfS were wrongfully to take any amount from the sum
Moriginally entrusted to her, she would not have committed larceny because
there would be no breach of possession.
Additionally, if a third person (for example, a customer) gives property
to the Servant to deliver to his Master, the Servant acquires possession.9
84. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 342, at 347-49 ("It is an offense against the right of
property or possession.").
85. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 32, § 8.1(a), at 329 (noting that "[o]ne would
think that, while the property was in the servant's hands, he has possession of it; his dominion
over the property looks, feels, smells and tastes exactly like possession").
86. See id. (discussing custody versus possession); see also GROOT, supra note 43, at 331
(discussing use or charge versus possession). Professor Groot explains that if the servant's
dominion over the property "amounts only to a bare use or charge of the chattel, possession
remains in the person from whom the use of the chattel was obtained.... The servant has a use
or charge and the master has possession .... " Id.
87. 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 358, at 417.
88. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 331 (noting that one with custody only is guilty of
larceny for misappropriation); see also 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 358, at 415 (describing
custody). Torcia states that "[a] caretaker, watchman, or other person, who has mere custody
of personal property, as distinguished from legal possession, is guilty of larceny when he
appropriates the property to his own use." Id.
89. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 241 (discussing positions of unusual confidence and
trust).
90. See id. (providing example). Perkins notes that "a bank teller is held to have posses-
sion of funds of the bank which have been intrusted to him for the purpose of transacting the
business of the bank." Id.
91. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 363, at 422 (discussing property received from third
person). Torcia notes that "[i]f a third person gives property to a servant to deliver to his
master, the servant is deemed to have possession." Id.
PLEADING FOR THEFT CONSOLIDATION IN VIRGNLI
Thus, S possesses the additional money that she accumulates over the course
of the day as a result of her sales. The Master does not acquire possession
until the Servant delivers the property to the Master or puts it in a place or
receptacle that the Master has designated or intends as the place where the
Servant should put the property.' IfSwere to place the money acquired from
customers immediately in her pocket instead of placing it in the receptacle or
place that Mdesignated (the till), she would not be guilty of larceny because
possession had not yet passed to M.93
On the other hand, possession of the money S adds to the till does
pass to M. If S were to misappropriate some of this money, she would be
guilty of larceny.94 This result may change with S's intent. IfS intends all
along to misappropriate the money she acquires from customers and merely
places the cash in the till, awaiting a more opportune moment, possession
would not pass to M.95 A subsequent conversion of such money by S would
92. See id. (noting that master does not acquire possession until servant puts property "in
a receptacle or place designated or intended by" the master); see also 2 LAFAVE& SCOTT, supra
note 32, § 8.2(b), at 336 (stating that "if the property comes to the servant from a third person
for the master, the servant has possession until he puts it in some receptacle (such as a cash
drawer) designated by the master for its reception").
93. See The King v. Bazeley (Bazeley's Case), 168 Eng. Rep. 517, 523 (Ex. Ch. 1799)
(struggling with question of whether prisoner or bank had possession). In this case, a bank
teller, whose duty it was to receive money on behalf of the bank, placed a£100 note in his pocket
and subsequently converted it to his own use. Id. at 517-18. Thejudges finally "agreed that it
was not felony, inasmuch as the note was never in the possession of the bankers, distinct from
thepossession ofthe prisoner: though itwould have been otherwise ifthe prisonerhad deposited
it in the drawer, and had afterwards taken it." Id. at523 n.(a); see also2LAFAVE&SCOTT, supra
note 32, § 8.1(b), at 331 (providing summary of Bazeley's Case). LaFave and Scott note:
One might think that, as long as the judges had been pretending that, when an em-
ployer hands property to his employee, he still keeps possession, they might as easily
pretend that, as soon as the depositor handed the money to the employee, possession
(of the "constructive" sort) immediately lodged in the employer, the employee
acquiring mere "custody," so that his misappropriation would amount to larceny.
Id. However, as indicated above, the judges decided that such an employee maintained posses-
sion until the employee deposited the property in some receptacle provided by the employer. Id.
94. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 363, at 422 (discussing property received from third
persons). Torcia notes:
If the servant, after delivering the property to his master or putting it in a receptacle
or place designated or intended by the master, returns later to appropriate it to his
own use, he would of course be guilty of larceny because he would then be taking
from the possession of another.
Id.
95. See id. § 363, at 423 (discussing receipt ofproperty fromthirdpersons). Torcianotes:
[ljfthe servant, after receiving possession of the money, intends to appropriate it to
his own use and drops it into the cash register with the intent to take it out later at a
more convenient or opportune time, remaining upon the scene exercising dominion
and control over such cash register, possession does not pass to the master ....
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not amount to larceny.96
Bailments differ from the master-servant context. The law deems bailees
to be in lawful possession.97 If a bailee, after rightfully acquiring possession,
converts the property to his own use, he may be guilty of embezzlement.98
The bailee cannot be guilty of larceny because no taking from the possession
of another occurs. 99 Note that if the bailee's intent to misappropriate the
property precedes, or coincides with, the acquisition of possession, the bailee
has committed larceny by trick. " Interestingly, a bailor may commit larceny.
Once the true owner bails the goods, and the bailee acquires legal possession,
the true owner/bailor may commit larceny by stealing the property back from
the bailee. "' Under this theory, for example, the owner of a watch who bails
96. See id. (noting that possession does not pass to master when servant always intended
to steal money).
97. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 331 (discussing possession in bailment context).
98. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 359, at 418 (noting that bailee may be guilty of
embezzlement).
99. See id. (noting that bailee in lawful possession cannot be guilty of larceny because
there is no trespassory taking).
100. See id. (noting possibility of larceny in bailment context). Torcia notes that "[o]f
course, if the bailee, with the intent to misappropriate, fraudulently induced the owner to part
with the possession of his property, his act of misappropriation would constitute larceny by
trick." Id.; see Starkie v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 752, 757 (1836) (noting difference
between obtaining possession lawfully and by fraud). Starkie is Virginia's version of Pear's
Case. Starkie was an employee of Wilson. Id. at 753. He obtained Wilson's consent to borrow
a horse for two hours. Id. Starkie did not return with the horse; he sold it the following day to
a third person. Id. at 753-54. Authorities subsequently apprehended Starkie, who eventually
confessed to selling the horse. Id. at 754-55. Starkie professed that when he borrowed the
horse, he had not yet formed the intent to steal it. Id. at 755. The Commonwealth tried and
convicted Starkie for the larceny of the horse, saddle, and bridle. Id. at 752-53. On appeal,
Starkie argued that the evidence showed only a breach of trust, not a breach of possession. Id.
at 755-56. The court noted two grounds for sustaining the conviction. Id. at 756-57. First,
because Wilson lent the horse to Starkie for temporary use only, Starkie did not acquire legal
possession. Id. at 756. Second, the court found that the evidence supported the jury's conclu-
sion that Starkie obtained the use of the horse fraudulently. Id. In refusing Starkie's writ of
error, the court concluded:
We think the law well settled, that where a person obtains the goods of another by
lawful delivery, without fraud, although he afterwards converts them to his own use,
he is not guilty of felony; but if such delivery be obtained by any fraud or falsehood,
and with an intent to steal, though under pretence of hiring, borrowing, or even
purchase, where no credit is intended to be given, the delivery in fact by the owner
will not pass the legal possession, so as to save the party from the guilt of larceny.
Id. at 757.
101. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 32, § 8.4(c), at 356 (noting that larceny occurs
when owner steals from bailee); PERKINS, supra note 43, at 239 (stating that "[e]ven the owner
himself may commit larceny by stealing his own goods if they are in the possession of another
and he takes them from the possessor wrongfully with intent to deprive him of a property
interest therein").
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that watch to a jeweler for repairs is guilty of larceny if the owner regains
possession of the watch without the jeweler's consent.
Reasoning by analogy, it would appear that a stranger who steals from
the bailee is guilty of larceny from the bailee alone, because only the bailee
has legal possession. After all, common law larceny is a crime against posses-
sion, not ownership, and can occur only against a possessor. 2 Such a prem-
ise tends to suggest that Catterton is a derogation from the common law.
Catterton was a case in which a stranger stole from a bailee, but Virginia
convicted him of stealing from the true owner. 3 In fact, Catterton's sugges-
tion of a derogation from the common law was the essence of his unsuccessful
appeal."' Because § 19.2-284 provided the foundation for the derogation in
Catterton,"'5 one commentator has accused this statute of altering the common
law rules in Virginia."°6
Yet despite this criticism, some authority suggests that Catterton is
consistent with the common law. 7 Both the real owner and the bailee may
have interests in the property sufficient to warrant protection from thieving
strangers."° In the nineteenth century, Virginia apparently subscribed to this
102. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 334 (noting that common law "larceny could be
committed only against a possessor").
103. See Cattertonv. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d748, 749-50 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (noting
that Catterton stole from bailee, but Commonwealth convicted him of stealing from true
owner).
104. See id. at 749 (noting Catterton's argument).
105. See id. at 750 (citing Latham v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 36, 38-39 (Va. 1946))
(providing authority for decision). Latham, in turn, relies on Code of Virginia § 4872. Latham,
37 S.E.2d at38 (citing VA. CODEANN. § 4872 (Michie 1942)). This section remains virtually
unchanged as § 19.2-284. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995).
106. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 334 (stating that "these common law rules have been
substantially altered by § 19.2-284").
107. See Larceny, supra note 61, § 81(1)(a) (notingthatstate may ordinarily allege owner-
ship of property to be in owner or person in possession at time of theft). The C.LS. notes that
"[tihe ownership of property stolen from the possession of a balee may be laid either in the
bailor or the bailee." Id. § 81(2)(b) (footnote omitted).
108. See 2 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE MISDE-
MEANORS * 156-57 (discussing special property in ownership of goods). Russell states:
There is no doubt that there may be a sufficient ownership of the goods stolen in
a person who has only a specialproperty in them; and that they may be laid as the
goods and chattels of such person in the indictment. A lessee for years, a bailee,
a pawnee, a carrier, -and the like, have such special property; and the indictment
will be good, if it lay the property of the goods, either in the real owners, or in the
persons having only such special property in them.
Id.; see 2 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 16, § 90, at 652
(1806). East states:
Any one [sic] who has a special property in goods stolen may lay them to be his
in an appeal or indictment for larceny; as bailee, pawnee, lessee foryears, carrier,
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rule."° In a bailment context, the Commonwealth may have alleged the stolen
property to be in either the bailor or the bailee."' There was one exception.
In an indictment for larceny, it was not necessary to state that the defendant
took the property from the possession of anyone."' However, if the indict-
ment did allege a taking from the possession of someone, the proof had to
conform to that allegation."' Thus, when an indictment alleged that a person
stolefrom the possession of the bailor, proof that the accused actually took
from the bailee could not support the charge."' When the indictment was
silent on the issue of possession, proof that the accused stole from either the
general owner or the special owner would suffice." 4 The Virginia Supreme
or the like; afortiori, they may be laid to be the property of the respective owners;
and the indictment is good either way.
Id.; seel MATrHEwHALETHEHIsToRYoFTHEPLEASoFTHECRoWN *512-13 (noting that "[i]f
A. bail goods to B. to keep for him, or carry for him, and B. be robbed of them, the felon may
be indicted for larc[e]ny of the goods of A. or B. and it is good either way, for the property is
still in A. yet B. hath the possession").
109. See MINOR, supra note 70, at 108 (noting that in case of bailment, Commonwealth
may allege property to be in either general owner or bailee).
110. See id. (noting that in case of bailment, Commonwealth may allege property to be in
either general owner or bailee).
111. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 135, 135 (1818) (finding that
indictment need not charge that accused stole property from owner or any other person). The
Commonwealth indicted Thompson for the larceny of a hat belonging to one Robert Moore.
1d. However, the indictment did not state that the accused took the hat from Moore's posses-
sion. Id. The court found that such a requirement was not necessary. Id.
112. See MINOR, supra note 70, at 108 (stating that it "is not necessary to state that the
property was takenfrom the possession of any one, but if it is so averred it must be proved as
alleged, and the possession of the bailee is not that of the bailor").
113. See 2 RUSSELL, supra note 108, at *157 n.[1] (noting that "where the indictment
alleges that property was stolen 'out ofthe possession' ofthe bailor, proofthat it was taken from
the bailee will not support the charge"). Thus, when an indictment alleged the larceny of a slave
from the possession of one Elizabeth Edwards, but the evidence showed larceny from the
possession of Thomas Edwards, the charge was not sustainable. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 14, 14-15 (1791). An indictment alleging the larceny of a slave
belonging to (and not from the possession of) Elizabeth Edwards would have supported the
charge. See MINOR, supra note 70, at 108 (noting that allegation of possession in larceny
indictment is not required).
114. See 23 RuLiNG CASE LAW § 20, at 1154 (1919) (discussing ownership of property)
[hereinafter 23 R.C.L.]. The Ruling Case Law notes:
The great majority of the reported cases uphold the rule that an indictment for
larceny, robbery, or some other crime based on a larceny, which alleges ownership
in a certain person, will be sustained by proofthat such person is the agent or bailee
of the true owner, or has, in behalf of the owner, the control, care, and management
of the property stolen. In a few cases, the allegation of ownership has been held
insufficient; but, in these cases, for the most part, the general rule is asserted, the
court holding, however, that the person in whom the ownership was laid did not
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Court reaffirmed this rule in Booth v. Commonwealth."5 This case provided
the basis for the decision in Latham."6 Latham, in turn, provided the nexus
between the common law rule and what is now § 19.2-284."' The Latham
court noted that the rule stated in Booth is consistent with Virginia's statute
regarding possession of stolen goods."" Fifty years later, Latham would
provide the authority for the Court of Appeals's decision in Catterton."9
Thus, Catterton, traced through this indirect genealogy, appears legiti-
mate. The indictment against Catterton charged the larceny of a Ford Bronco
"belonging to Debora Brooke."'2° The indictment was silent on the issue of
possession.' The common law did not obligate the Commonwealth to prove,
as Catterton contended," that Catterton took the Bronco from the me-
chanic/bailee, nor did it require the Commonwealth to prove that Catterton
took the vehicle from Brooke.
bear the relationship of agent or bailee to the true owner. There is no distinction
made by the cases between the different crimes, and the same rule is equally appli-
cable to larceny or robbery, or other crimes based on a larceny.
Id.; see Larceny, supra note 61, § 99(b)(1) (discussing quality and character ofownership). The
C.J.S. notes that "[i]n a prosecution for larceny, an allegation of ownership of stolen goods is
supported by proof of any legal interest or special property in them, although less than the
absolute title." Id.
115. See Booth v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E. 257, 258 (Va. 1936) (quoting 23 R.C.L.,
supra note 114, § 20, at 1154) (noting proof of theft from either general or special owner
sufficient for indictment that is silent on issue of possession). Booth appealed his robbery
conviction on the ground that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof.
d at 257. The Commonwealth arrested Booth for the robbery oflD. Pender Grocery Company.
Id. at 258. The indictment stated that the money stolen belonged to R.E. Thompson, the
manager ofthe store. Id. Booth contended on appeal that the evidence produced at trial showed
the property actually belonged to D. Pender Grocery Company, not R.E. Thompson. Id. at 257.
The court found that "an indictment for larceny ... which alleges ownership in a certain person,
will be sustained by proof that such person is the agent or bailee of the true owner, or has, in
behalf of the owner, the control, care, and management of the property stolen." Id. at 258
(quoting 23 R.C.L., supra note 114, § 20, at 1154). Because Thompson was in charge of the
store, he had custody of the stolen money. Id. Therefore, the allegation that he was the owner
was sufficient. Id.
116. See Latham v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 36,38 (Va. 1946) (relying on Booth).
117. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that Latham court regarded
common law rule to be consistent with what is now § 19.2-284).
118. Latham, 37 S.E.2d at 38 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 4872 (Michie 1942) (current
version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995))).
119. Catterton v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 748, 750 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Latham, 37 S.E.2d at 38-39).
120. Id. at 749.
121. See id. (illustrating absence of possession element in indictment).
122. See id. (noting Catterton's contention that bailee became "owner" for purpose of
proving larceny).
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Moreover, as old as these rules are, they are consistent with Virginia's
current definition of larceny." Although larceny is traditionally a crime
against possession, 24 Virginia chooses instead to focus on the element of
ownership. 1" Such a focus escapes the technical rigidity of a reliance on
possession inwhich there can be only one priorpossessor. Although ownership
and possession may be synonymous,126 the focus on ownership more readily
allows the incorporation of the concepts of special and general property. Thus,
§ 19.2-284, which creates this incorporation by statute,'27 is not a departure
from the common law, but rather a codification."2 ' The fact that this statute has
survived, virtually unchanged, since the Virginia Code of 1849129 further
supports its consistency with the common law. In sum, § 19.2-284 does not
alter the current substance of the law of larceny. The next two Parts consider
whether this is the case with respect to embezzlement and false pretenses.
123. See Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (Va. 1945) (citing Vaughan v.
Lytton, 101 S.E. 865, 867 (Va. 1920)) (defining larceny as "the wrongful or fraudulent taking
ofpersonal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and with the
intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently"); Walker v. Commonwealth, 486 S.E.2d
126, 130 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 414,417 (Va. Ct.
App. 1986)) (same).
124. See supra note 43 (noting that larceny is crime against possession).
125. See Walker, 486 S.E.2d at 130 (noting an "intention to deprive the owner thereof
permanently" (emphasis added)).
126. SeeLarceny, supra note 61, § 13(b) (discussingwhatconstitutes ownership in larceny
context). The C.J.S. states: "Considered as an element of larceny, 'ownership' and 'possession'
may be regarded as synonymous terms, for one who has a right to the possession of goods as
against the thief, as far as he is concerned, is the owner of them." Id.
127. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (noting that "it shall be sufficient to
prove that when the offense was committed ... a general or special property... was in the
person.., alleged in the indictment or other accusation to be the owner thereof').
128. See Latham v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 36,38-39 (Va. 1946) (noting consistency
between common law rules and Code of Virginia § 4872 (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-284 (Michie 1995))).
129. Compare VA. CODE, ch. 207, § 8 (1849) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
284 (Michie 1995)) (stating that"[i]n a prosecution for an offence, committed upon or relating
to or affecting real estate, or for stealing, embezzling, destroying, injuring or fraudulently
receiving or concealing, any personal estate, it shall be sufficient to prove, that when the offence
was committed, the actual or constructive possession, or a general or special property, in the
whole or any part of such estate, was in the person or community alleged, in the indictment or
other accusation, to be the owner thereof') with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995)
(stating that "[i]n a prosecution for an offense committed upon, relating to or affecting real
estate, or for stealing, embezzling, destroying, injuring or fraudulently receiving or concealing
any personal estate it shall be sufficient to prove that when the offense was committed the actual
or constructive possession, or a general or special property, in the whole or any part of such
estate was in the person or entity alleged in the indictment or other accusation to be the owner
thereof').
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IV. Embezzlement and § 19.2-284
Embezzlement is the conversion of lawfully possessed property."
However, unlike larceny, embezzlement was not a crime at common law.'
Larceny required a trespassory taking. 3 2 As a result, those individuals who
had lawfully acquired possession of property could not be guilty of larceny for
subsequently misappropriating that property.13 In order to mend these inter-
stices, the English Parliament created the statutory crime of embezzlement. 
3
The problems associated with the gaps that larceny left uncovered cul-
minated in 1799 with The King v. Bazeley (Bazeley's Case).3 Bazeley, in his
capacity as a bank teller, received a £100 note for deposit.36 After recording
the transaction, Bazeley placed the note in his own pocket and later used it to
pay off a personal debt. 37 At that time, servants who misappropriated prop-
erty received from third persons fortheirmaster committed only a civil breach
of trust13 " The judges concluded that Bazeley was not guilty of felony (that
130. See HALL, supra note 21, at 289 (noting that embezzlement is usually conversion of
legally possessed property).
131. See 2 LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 32, § 8.6, at 368 (noting that embezzlement is
statutory crime); PERKINS, supra note 43, at 286 (noting that embezzlement is not common law
crime); 3 TORcIA, supra note 61, § 383, at 465 (noting that embezzlement is creature only of
statute).
132. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 185 (noting that common law larceny required taking
from possession of another); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 32, § 8.1, at 328 (noting that
larceny requires "trespass in the taking").
133. See 3 TORCLA, supra note 61, § 383, at 463-64 (noting that such misappropriation
could not "constitute larceny because there is no trespassory taking from the possession of
another"); see also GROOT, supra note 43, at 185 (noting that "one who was lawfully in
possession and converted the goods to his own use could not be convicted of larceny").
134. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.6, at 368 (discussing need for crime of
embezzlement). LaFave and Scott note that "there was a large gap in larceny caused by lar-
ceny's requirement of a trespass in the taking.... So the English legislature created the new
crime of embezzlement to fill this loophole." Id.; see PERKINS, supra note 43, at 286 (noting
that embezzlement "is the result of legislative efforts to make provision for an unreasonable gap
which appeared in the law of larceny as it developed"); 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 383, at 464-
65 (noting that "it was to fill this gap in the law of larceny that the offense of embezzlement, a
creature only of statute, found its way into Anglo-American law" (footnote omitted)).
135. The King v. Bazeley (Bazeley's Case), 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (Ex. Ch. 1799). Bazeley
worked as a bank teller. Id. at 517. After receiving money for deposit, Bazeley placed the
money in his own pocket. Id. He later used the money to pay a personal debt. Id. at 518. The
reviewing court concluded that there was no offense because possession of the money had not
yet passed to the bank. Id. at 523.
136. Id. at 517-18.
137. Id. at 518.
138. See HALL, supra note 21, at 37 (discussing birth of embezzlement). Hall notes that
"[tihe rule that a servant who converted goods or money received from a third person for his
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is, larceny) because, at the time of the taking, possession of the note had not
shifted to the bank.'39 Thus, despite his wrongful conduct, Bazeley went
unpunished.140
The court decided Bazeley's Case in April 1799.141 In July of that
year,' the English legislature responded with the first general embezzlement
statute.'43 However, this statute" was not a panacea. The statute applied to
little more than facts analogous to Bazeley's Case.'45 It covered only clerks
and servants'46 and left several loopholes unremedied. 47 Thus, from 1812 to
master committed merely a civil breach of trust, provided a constantly recurring problem until
1799." Id.
139. Bazeley's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. at 519. The court noted:
The prosecutors in the present case had only a right or title to possess the note, and
not the absolute or even qualified possession of it. It was never in their custody or
under their controul [sic].... [A]t the time therefore of the supposed conversion
of this note, it was in the legal possession of the prisoner.
Id.
140. Id. at 523.
141. See HALL, supra note 21, at 38 (noting that parties argued Bazeley's Case on April
24, 1799).
142. See 39 Geo. 3, ch. 85 (1799) (Eng.) (punishing embezzlementby clerks and servants),
repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 27 (1827) (Eng.). The statute passed on July 12, 1799. 39 Geo.
3, ch. 85 (1799) (Eng.).
143. See The King v. Bazeley (Bazeley's Case), 168 Eng. Rep. 517, 523 (Ex. Ch. 1799)
(noting that "in consequence of this case the statute 39 Geo. III. c. 85 was passed"); 3 TORCiA,
supra note 61, § 383, at 466-67 (noting English embezzlement statute passed as result of
Bazeley's Case); see also 2 EAST, supra note 108, ch. 16, § 18, at 574 (discussing ramifications
of Bazeley's Case). East notes:
This decision, however just in leaning to the merciful side on a doubtful question of
law, having opened a door to the most alarming and extensive frauds by servants in
general, and particularly in those instances where from the very nature of their
employmentthey were unavoidably entrusted withthe receipt of large sums ofmoney
in commercial transactions, the legislature thought it necessary to interfere immedi-
ately, and accordingly the declaratory act of the 39 Geo. 3. ch. 85. was passed ....
Id.
144. 39 Geo. 3, ch. 85 (1799) (Eng.).
145. See HALL, supra note 21, at 39 (noting scope of statute). Hall notes that "[tihough
it extended beyond employees of bankers, it still bore the mark of Bazeley's Case." Id.
146. See 39 Geo. 3, ch. 85 (1799) (Eng.) (criminalizing embezzlement by servants and
clerks). The statute was entitled: "An act to protect masters against embezzlements by their
clerks or servants." Id.
147. See The King v. Walsh, 168 Eng. Rep. 624,637 (Ex. Ch. 1812) (finding that misap-
propriation of money by agent was not felony). Walsh, in his capacity as a stockbroker, received
a check from his principal with directions to purchase certain stock. Id. at 625. Walsh pur-
chased the stock with part of the money and absconded with the remainder. Id. at 624-25. Such
conduct did not fall under the existing embezzlement statute, 39 Geo. 3, ch. 85, because it was
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1857, Parliament passed a series of laws that brought agents, trustees, and
bailees within the scope of embezzlement. 4'
The American states generally followed the English pattern.'49 Embez-
zlement was a new offense, created by statute and designed to fill the gaps in
larceny. 5 Generally, embezzlement is the misappropriation of property with
which one is entrusted.' Despite its relation to larceny, embezzlement was
a distinct offense; the two crimes did not overlap. 2 However, in cases in
which the facts might support either charge, the distinction became very fine.
One example of this fine distinction was when a servant (employee) had
dominion over his master's (employer's) property. The servant did not have
a mere breach of trust. See HALL, supra note 21, at 39 (noting that Walsh's conduct did not fall
within meaning of 39 Geo. 3, ch. 85).
148. See 3 JAMES FiTJAMEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
157-58 (1883) (discussing criminal breach of trust). Stephen notes:
The fraudulent misappropriation ofproperty is not a criminal offence, ifthe posses-
sion of it was originally honestly acquired, except in the case of
(1) Servants embezzling their masters' property, who were first excepted in 1799.
(2) Brokers, merchants, bankers, attorneys, and other agents, misappropriating
property intrusted to them, who were first excepted in 1812.
(3) Factors fraudulently pledging goods intrusted to them for sale, who were first
excepted in 1827.
(4) Trustees under express trusts fraudulently disposing of trust funds, who were
first excepted in 1857.
(5) Bailees stealing the goods bailed to them, who also were first excepted in 1857.
Id. at 158-59.
149. See 2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 32, § 8.6, at 368-69 (noting general adherence
to England's practice); PERKINS, supra note 43, at 287 (noting that legislative history of
embezzlement in America is comparable to that in England).
150. See 2 LAFAVE & SCorr, supra note 32, § 8.6, at 369 (discussing evolution of
embezzlement in America). Embezzlement was an invention "created by the legislature for the
specific purpose of plugging loopholes left by the narrowness of the crime of larceny." Id.
151. See id (notingthatembezzlementisfraudulentconversionofpropertyby oneentrusted
with that property); see also PERKINS, supra note 43, at 288 (discussing legislative history of
embezzlement in America). Perkins notes:
[The American embezzlement] statutes had one element in common in addition to
the fact that they all applied to the fraudulent conversion of property which is
accomplished without trespass. This was that the property had been entrusted to
the converter either by or for the owner. The statutes are frequently worded in such
terms and the tendency has been to supply this element by interpretation where it
is not expressed.
Id. (footnote omitted).
152. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 289-90 (noting distinction between larceny and
embezzlement). Because embezzlement and larceny evolved separately, "courts have generally
held or assumed that these crimes do not overlap, that they are mutually exclusive." 2 LAFAVE
& Scorr, supra note 32, § 8.6(a), at 369.
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possession of that property. 53 As a result, this servant could not commit
embezzlement by misappropriating the property; such conduct amounted to
larceny.1 54 However, the common law treated employees with special respon-
sibilities as agents rather than servants.' 55 If the agent received more than
simple charge of the property for a limited purpose, the agent stood in posses-
sion and, thus, could commit embezzlement, but not larceny.1
56
Although Virginia generally adheres to these classical rules,'57 the Com-
monwealth's embezzlement statute5 . does not fully parallel the traditional
definition of that crime. 59 Virginia's interpretation of embezzlement is
153. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing custody versus possession
issue); see also I HALE, supra note 108, at *506 (noting that "[h]e, that hath the care of an-
other's goods hath not possession of them"); PERKINs, supra note 43, at 240 (noting that "the
control of an employee for his employer usually results in custody only").
154. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 289 (discussing embezzlement). Perkins states: "The
ordinary employee who receives possession from his employer has custody only and not posses-
sion. His fraudulent appropriation of the property so received is larceny, hence he may properly
be convicted if the charge is larceny but not if it is embezzlement." Id. (footnotes omitted).
155. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 355 (3d ed. 1982)
(describing employee with special responsibilities as agent).
156. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 361, at 421 (discussing taking by agent). Torcia
states:
If the agent receives bare charge of the property for some limited purpose, he is
deemed merely to have custody and is in a position similar to that of a servant; in
which case he is guilty of larceny when he appropriates the property to his own use.
If the agent is deemed to be in possession of his principal's property, and he
appropriates it to his own use, he may be guilty of embezzlement but, because there
is no taking from the possession of another, he cannot be guilty of larceny.
Id. (footnote omitted).
157. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 185 (noting that "[a]t common law larceny and
embezzlement were distinct crimes and the same is generally true in Virginia").
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (defining embezzlement). Virginia's
embezzlement statute states:
If any person wrongfully and fraudulently use, dispose of, conceal or embezzle any
money, bill, note, check, order, draft, bond, receipt, bill of lading or any other
personal property, tangible or intangible, which he shall have received for another
or for his employer, principal or bailor, or by virtue of his office, trust, or employ-
ment, or which shall have been entrusted or delivered to him by another or by any
court, corporation or company, he shall be guilty ofembezzlement. Embezzlement
shall be deemed larceny and upon conviction thereof, the person shall be punished
as provided in § 18.2-95 or § 18.2-96.
Id.
159. See Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687, 691 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) ("The
definition of embezzlement in Code § 18.2-111 does not parallel the traditional definition of
that crime; rather it proscribes a broad category of theft offenses, including embezzlement,
which fall outside the common law definition of larceny.").
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somewhat broader in scope."6 Section 18.2-111 is a general embezzlement
statute encompassing at once the whole series of English embezzlement
statutes. 61 Over the years, this expansive interpretation of embezzlement has
created inconsistent results that blur the distinction between embezzlement
and larceny and may indicate a trend towards consolidation. For example,
although the Virginia courts have generally followed the rule that employees
with special authority are embezzlers," the courts have sometimes treated
similar cases in which the accused employees have substantial authority as
larcenies.' 63
Additionally, Virginia deems embezzlement to be larceny."6 This is
especially true for punishment purposes.165 The fact that the punishment for
embezzlement is the same as for larceny suggests that there is no moral differ-
ence between the two crimes."6 Yet, Virginia deems embezzlement to be
larceny for more than purposes of punishment.167 In Pitsnogle v. Common-
wealth, 61 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took the view that on an
indictment for larceny, proof of embezzlement would sustain the charge.
69
Prior to 1994, Virginia maintained a codification of this rule in its embezzle-
160. See id. (noting broad definition of embezzlement). The court in Gwaltney stated that
"[iun this Commonwealth, our legislature has addressed the problem by adopting a broad
definition of embezzlement, deeming it to be punishable as larceny and defining an array of
activities which fall within its ambit." Id.
161. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (incorporating agents, bailees,
employees, and trustees).
162. See Simmons v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 359,359 (Va. 1978) (charging embez-
zlement when employee had special responsibility); Lee v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 152,
152 (Va. 1958) (same).
163. See Foster v. Commonwealth, 163 S.E.2d 601,601 (Va. 1968) (charging larceny by
employee); Walker v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 743, 743-44 (1837) (finding employee
with substantial control over goods in store and money in cash drawer guilty of larceny).
164. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (stating "[e]mbezzlement shall be
deemed larceny").
165. See id. (stating that upon conviction of embezzlement, person shall be punished
according to larceny statute).
166. See 2 LAFAvE& SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412 (noting that same punish-
ment suggests equal moral character).
167. See Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth, 22 S.E. 351, 352 (Va. 1895) (finding proof of
embezzlement sufficient to sustain larceny indictment).
168. 22 S.E. 351 (Va. 1895).
169. Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth, 22 S.E. 351, 352 (Va. 1895). The Commonvealth
indicted and convicted Pitsnogle for the larceny of a gold watch. Id. at 351. On appeal,
Pitsnogle contended that the Commonwealth had failed to prove larceny; rather the Common-
wealth had proved embezzlement. Id. Pitsnogle's argument was that proof of embezzlement
would not support an indictment for common law larceny. Id. However, the court found that
on an indictment for larceny, proof of embezzlement would suffice. Id. at 352.
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ment statute. 71 However, the statute provided a possible means with which
to defeat this operation.'' A defendant facing a larceny indictment could,
prior to trial, require the Commonwealth to elect the crime on which it would
rely. 72 Such language implies that if the Commonwealth elected to proceed
on the theory of larceny, proof of embezzlement at trial would not support a
conviction. Thus, when a defendant exercised his election right, larceny and
embezzlement remained distinct. 73 However, when the defendant failed to
require the Commonwealth to elect, upon a larceny indictment at least, embez-
zlement and larceny consolidated. 74
For a span of one hundred years, this rule seemed crystallized. However,
in 1994, the Virginia legislature amended its embezzlement statute. 75 The
Commonwealth still deems embezzlement to be larceny, but the amended
statute eliminated the clause allowing the Commonwealth to indict embezzle-
ment as larceny and the clause permitting proof of embezzlement to sustain
a charge of larceny. 76 The amendment significantly altered the meaning of
170. See VA. CoDEAN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1982) (amended 1994) (defining embezzle-
ment). The embezzlement statute provided in part:
If any person wrongfully and fraudulently use, dispose of, conceal or embezzle any
money, bill, note, check, order, draft, bond, receipt, bill of lading or any other
personal property, tangible or intangible, which he shall have received for another
or for his employer, principal or bailor, or by virtue of his office, trust, or employ-
ment, or which shall have been entrusted or delivered to him by another or by any
court, corporation or company, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof may
be indicted as for larceny, and proof of embezzlement under this section shall be
sufficient to sustain the charge.
Id. (emphasis added).
171. See id. (noting that defendant may demand that Commonwealth elect offense upon
which it will rely).
172. See id. (noting that defendant may demand to know offense upon which Common-
wealth plans to rely). The statute provided:
On the trial of every indictment for larceny, however, the defendant, if he demands
it, shall be entitled to a statement in writing from the attorney for the Common-
wealth designating the statute he intends to rely upon to ask for conviction. Such
statement shall be furnished to the defendant, or his attorney, no later than five days
prior to the date fixed for trial on the indictment provided the demand is made more
than five days prior to such date.
Id.
173. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 185-86 (noting that election maintains distinction
between larceny and embezzlement).
174. See id. at 185 (noting that Commonwealth is probably permitted to prove embezzle-
ment when it alleges larceny).
175. See 1994 Va. Acts ch. 554 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie
1996)) (amending and eliminating second half of embezzlement statute).
176. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (eliminating half offormer statutory
language). The statute now merely provides:
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the remainder of the statute.177 The pre-1994 version deemed someone vio-
lating the embezzlement statute to be guilty of larceny.78 The amended
version now defines such conduct as embezzlement. 79 By altering the nature
of the offense, the Virginia legislature has resurrected the distinction between
larceny and embezzlement. Pitsnogle"8' remains valid law, but the omission
of the statutory codification of that rule in the amended embezzlement statute181
suggests a reactionary trend. Larceny and embezzlement are separate and
distinct offenses, and Virginia deems embezzlement to be larceny only for
purposes of punishment. 82
Nonetheless, further evidence of a trend towards consolidation exists.
One year after the Virginia legislature amended its embezzlement statute, the
Virginia Court of Appeals, in Gwaltney v. Commonwealth,"3 expanded em-
bezzlement to cover what would have constituted larceny at common law.'84
If any person wrongfully and fraudulently use, dispose of, conceal or embezzle any
money, bill, note, check, order, draft, bond, receipt, bill of lading or any other
personal property, tangible or intangible, which he shall have received for another
or for his employer, principal or bailor, or by virtue of his office, trust, or employ-
ment, or which shall have been entrusted or delivered to him by another or by any
court, corporation or company, he shall be guilty of embezzlement. Embezzlement
shall be deemed larceny and upon conviction thereof, the person shall be punished
as provided in § 18.2-95 or § 18.2-96.
Id. (emphasis added).
177. See id. (amending embezzlement statute so embezzler is guilty of embezzlement and
not larceny).
178. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1982) (amended 1994) (deeming conduct
statute prescribed as larceny).
179. See VA. CODEAN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (defining infraction as embezzlement).
180. See Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth, 22 S.E. 351, 352 (Va. 1895) (noting that proof of
embezzlement will support larceny indictment).
181. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (omitting rule allowing proof of
embezzlement to sustain larceny indictment).
182. See 29A C.J.S. Embezzlement § 5(b) (1992) (discussing punishment of embezzlement
and larceny). The C.J.S. notes that "[w]hile some statutes designate embezzlement as larceny,
or provide that it shall be punishable as such, the two offenses are nevertheless generally
regarded as separates and distinct." Id. (footnote omitted).
183. 452 S.E.2d 687 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
184. See Gwaltneyv. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687,690-92 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (noting
that Gwaltuey's conduct might be larceny at common law). Gwaltney worked as a bank teller.
Id. at 689. At work, she misappropriated $1000 from the till of a co-worker. Id. The Common-
wealth indicted and convicted Gwaltuey of embezzlement. Id. at 688. Gwaltney argued to the
appellate court that the evidence was insufficient to prove the entrustment relationship that
embezzlement required because she took the money not from her own till, but from that of a co-
worker. Id. at 690. Her argument was that the bank did not entrust her with the money in other
tellers' tills. Id. Therefore, she was not in possession of that money and could not have
committed embezzlement. Id. at 691. The court found that Gwaltney's position of trust
extended throughout the bank, not merely to her own till. Id. at 691-92. Through the trust of
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Gwaltney, in her capacity as a bank teller, misappropriated $1000 from the till
of a co-worker.'85 The Commonwealth convicted her ofembezzlement. 86 On
appeal, Gwaltney argued that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
prove the entrustment relationship that embezzlement requires because she
took the money not from her own till, but from that of another teller. 7
Because the bank did not entrust her with the money in her co-worker's till,
she was not in possession of that money.' Absent possession, Gwaltney
argued that she could not have committed embezzlement. 9 However, the
court found that although Gwaltney was directly responsible only for her own
cash register, her position of trust was not confined to her till.' 9 The scope
of her entrustment extended throughout the bank.'91 Thus, "by virtue of [her]
office, trust or employment,"'92 Gwaltney was able to misappropriate the
money.193 Accordingly, she was guilty of embezzlement.
19 4
Although this case may be distinguishable on the grounds that it deals
with and is limited to bank tellers, in whom employers place some heightened
her employment, Gwaltney was able to misappropriate the money. Id. at 692. Thus, she was
guilty of embezzlement. Id.
185. Id. at 689-90.
186. Id. at 688.
187. Id. at 690.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 691 (noting that "a 'black letter' embezzlement statute requires proof of a
lawful possession prior to or contemporaneous with an intentional conversion by misappropria-
tion").
190. Id. at 691-92.
191. Id. The court added:
Gwaltney was placed in a position of trust by her employer. While she was directly
responsible for accounting only for the receipt and disbursement of funds to and
from the cash drawer assigned to her, Gwaltney's position of trust extended beyond
the confines of her station to the entire teller line and other areas of the bank where
her duties would bring her into proximity of her employer's property.
Id.
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (defining embezzlement).
193. Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687, 692 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). The court
noted:
The entrustment was inherent in her employment rather than in the daily act of
receiving into her possession and dispersing funds from a specific cash drawer. But
for the trust placed in her by her employer, Gwaltney would not have been able to
accomplish the conversion of cash from anotherteller's cash drawerto her own use.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth established the wrongful taking ofmoney received
"by virtue of [her] office, trust or employment' in violation of Code § 18.2-111.
Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996)).
194. Id.
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quantum of trust, Gwaltney nonetheless suggests that Virginia now interprets
the entrustment element of embezzlement, at least in one employment context,
as a function of access. Any employee who, by virtue of her employment,
merely has access to the employer's property is capable of embezzlement. 95
Such an inference blurs the custody-possession distinction inherent between
common law larceny and traditional embezzlement. 196 In cases involving
employees, the two crimes overlap. Under this interpretation, the Common-
wealth always should charge embezzlement in employee-theft cases.197
Charging embezzlement will permit conviction of any employee, whereas
charging larceny may preclude conviction in cases involving an employee
with special responsibilities or managerial status. 9 Thus, independent of
§ 19.2-284,' 99 the Commonwealth has taken a step toward theft consolidation
through this broad interpretation of embezzlement.
However, even after Gwaltney's expansive interpretation of embezzle-
ment,2" some Virginiajurists continue to interpret larceny and embezzlement
as separate and distinct offenses.2 " In Cera v. Commonwealth, °2 the Court
of Appeals of Virginia reiterated the distinction between the two crimes.0 3
195. See id. at691-92 (noting employee's position oftrustextendedto anywhere her duties
brought her into proximity of employer's property).
196. Seesupra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between custody
and possession in common law larceny and traditional embezzlement).
197. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 186 (noting that safest course for Commonwealth in
employee-theft cases is to charge embezzlement).
198. See id. at 185-86 (discussing election to charge embezzlement in employee-theft
cases). Professor Groot notes: "That choice will clearly permit conviction of an employee who
has managerial status. The choice will apparently permit conviction of any employee." Id. at
186 (footnote omitted).
199. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (discussing proofofownership intheft
related offenses).
200. See Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687, 691-92 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
(interpreting Virginia's embezzlement statute broadly).
201. See Cera v. Commonwealth, No. 0432-94-4, 1995 WL 250816, at *2 (Va. Ct. App.
May 2, 1995) (noting distinction between larceny and embezzlement).
202. 1995 WL 250816 (Va. Ct. App. May, 2 1995).
203. See Cera v. Commonwealth, No. 0432-94-4, 1995 WL 250816, at *2 (Va. Ct. App.
May2,1995) (discussing distinctionbetweenlarcenyand embezzlement). The Ceracourtstated:
A person who takes personal property from the possession of another without the
owner's consent and with intent to deprive him of possession permanently is guilty
of common law larceny. A person entrusted with possession of another's person-
alty who converts such property to his own use or benefit is guilty of the statutory
offense of embezzlement
Id. (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 209,210 (Va. 1981)). In Cera, the Common-
wealth arrested Cera for embezzlement in January 1993. Id. at *1. The district court found
probable cause of embezzlement in a preliminary hearing on February 16, 1993. Id. However,
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The court found embezzlement and larceny to be separate offenses with
different elements.2°4 According to the court, larceny involves a trespassory
taking, whereas embezzlement involves misappropriation of property held
with the owner's permission."5 Cera suggests that despite the rule in Pits-
nogle,2t 6 Virginia maintains the distinction between larceny and embezzle-
ment. Moreover, a consistent reading of the two cases presents a lose-lose
dilemma for defendants. A defendant loses when the Commonwealth proves
embezzlement on a larceny indictment because the two offenses are the
same.20 7 Furthermore, a defendant loses a speedy trial claim2 " when the
Commonwealth arrests on a warrant charging embezzlement, but the grand
jury indicts on larceny, because the offenses are separate and distinct.2"
on March 9, the grand jury indicted Cera for grand larceny. Id. A jury convicted Cera of that
charge on December 1, 1993. Id. Prior to trial, Cera moved for a dismissal on the ground "that
the Commonwealth violated his right to a speedy trial under Virginia Code § 19.2-243 by
prosecuting him for grand larceny more than nine months after his preliminary hearing on the
embezzlement charge." Id. Cera argued that embezzlement and larceny are the same offense.
Id. Thus, "the nine months must run from the date of the preliminary hearing on the embezzle-
ment charge, not from the date of the indictment on the grand larceny charge." Id. The court
noted embezzlement and larceny are the same for the purpose of punishment, but found the
offenses otherwise distinct. Id. at *2. The two crimes are not the same offense for determining
time limits under the speedy trial statute. Id. As a result, the nine-month limitation began when
the Commonwealth indicted Cera because there was no preliminary hearing on the grand larceny
charge. Id.
204. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (noting distinctive elements).
205. See Cera, 1995 WL 250816, at *2 (noting difference between larceny and embezzle-
ment). The court noted: "[E]mbezzlement and larceny are separate offenses with different
elements. The key distinction between embezzlement and larceny is that larceny involves a
trespassory taking of property while embezzlement involves a conversion of property received
with the owner's consent." Id.
206. See Pitsnogle v. Commonwealth, 22 S.E. 351, 352 (Va. 1895) (noting that proof of
embezzlement will sustain larceny indictment).
207. See id. (noting proof of embezzlement sufficient to sustain larceny indictment).
208. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-243 (Michie 1995) (discussing limitations on prosecution
of felony due to lapse of time after finding of probable cause). This statute provides that in a
prosecution for felony, if the Commonwealth establishes probable cause in a preliminary
hearing, the Commonwealth must try the accused within five months if the accused remains in
custody, or within nine months if the accused does not remain in custody. Id. The statute
further provides:
If there was no preliminary hearing in the district court, or if such preliminary
hearing was waived by the accused, the commencement of the running of the five
and nine months periods, respectively, set forth in the section, shall be from the
date an indictment or presentment is found against the accused.
Id.
209. See Cera v. Commonwealth, No. 0432-94-4, 1995 WL 250816, at *2 (Va. Ct. App.
May 2, 1995) (noting that larceny and embezzlement are "separate offenses with different
elements").
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Virginia formulated the Pitsnogle rule over one hundred years ago,2 ' and the
codification of this rule in the Commonwealth's embezzlement statute is now
notably absent." Thus, despite the fact that Gwaltney blurred the line be-
tween the two offenses, the age of Pitsnogle, the 1994 statutory amendment,
and the recent distinction in Cera represent strong evidence that Virginia still
considers larceny and embezzlement to be separate crimes.
However, this conclusion is not an end to the inquiry. Even if larceny
and embezzlement are separate offenses with little overlap, it is likely that
§ 19.2-2842"2 cuts across the custody-possession distinction between the two
crimes.2 3 Section 19.2-284 provides that:
In a prosecution ... for stealing [or] embezzling ... it shall be sufficient
to prove that when the offense was committed the actual or constructive
possession, or a general or special property, in the whole or any part of
such estate was in the person... alleged in the indictment... to be the
owner thereof.
214
General property is the interest in the property held by the true owner.21
Special property, on the other hand, is an interest in property held for a tem-
210. See Pitsnogle, 22 S.E. at 352 (noting proof of embezzlement sufficient to sustain
larceny indictment).
211. Compare VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-11 (Michie 1979) (amended 1994) (incorporating
Pitsnogle rule and holding person committing prescribed conduct guilty of larceny) with VA.
CODEANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (eliminating Pitsnogle rule and holding person commit-
ting prescribed conduct guilty of embezzlement).
212. See VA. CoDEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (discussingproofofownership intheft
offenses).
213. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 209, 210 (Va. 1981) (noting possession
distinction between larceny and embezzlement). The Supreme Court of Virginia distinguished
larceny from embezzlement:
A person who takes personal property from the possession of another without the
owner's consent and with intent to deprive him of possession permanently is guilty
of common law larceny. A person entrusted with possession of another's person-
alty who converts such property to his own use or benefit is guilty of the statutory
offense of embezzlement
Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1979); Hewitt v. Commonwealth, 194 S.E.2d
893, 894 (Va. 1973)).
214. VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995). The entire statute reads:
In a prosecution for an offense committed upon, relating to or affecting real estate,
or for stealing, embezzling, destroying, injuring or fraudulently receiving or
concealing any personal estate it shall be sufficient to prove that when the offense
was committed the actual or constructive possession, or a general or special prop-
erty, in the whole or any part of such estate was in the person or entity alleged in
the indictment or other accusation to be the owner thereof.
Id.
215. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed. 1990) (defining general property).
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porary or limited nature, such as a bailee's interest in the property bailed."
This statute appears to eliminate completely the possession element on which
the distinction between larceny and embezzlement turns. 217 Whether the
charge is larceny or embezzlement, as long as the Commonwealth can prove
that the victim named in the indictment is either the true owner or has some
special interest in the property, the Commonwealth may obtain a conviction.
21
For example, the Commonwealth may convict a bailee with lawful possession
and an employee with managerial status or special responsibilities of larceny
from the true owner because the victim is the general owner.21 9 For the same
reasons, the Commonwealth may convict an employee with custody only of
embezzlement from the true owner."0 Thus, had the Gwaltney court predi-
cated its decision on § 19.2-284, there would have been no need to expand the
sphere of entrustment.22
The focus under § 19.2-284 is not on the concept of custody or posses-
sion; rather, the focus is on the victim's relationship to the property at issue.'
It appears that as long as the Commonwealth alleges misappropriation from
someone having an interest in the property, a conviction for either larceny or
embezzlement is sustainable if the proof of "ownership" conforms to the
allegation.' As a result, embezzlement merges with larceny; all embezzlers
may be convicted of larceny, and all thieves may be convicted of embezzle-
ment. Section 19.2-284, therefore, completes the process that Pitsnogle began
last century: consolidation of larceny and embezzlement.
216. See id. at 1218 (defining special property).
217. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (discussing proofofownership in theft
offenses).
218. See id. (discussing proof of ownership in theft cases).
219. See id. (noting that in theft offense, it is sufficient to prove general property in victim).
Section 19.2-284 states: "In a prosecution for... stealing.., it shall be sufficient to prove...
a general... property... was in the person.., alleged.., to be the owner [of the misappropri-
ated property]." Id.
220. See id. (noting that in theft offense, it is sufficient to prove general property in victim).
Section 19.2-284 states: "In a prosecution for... embezzling... it shall be sufficient to
prove.., a general ... property... was in the person.., alleged.., to be the owner [of the
misappropriated property]." Id.
221. See Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687, 691-92 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
(expanding scope ofentrustmentto entire teller line). The Commonwealth prosecuted Gwaltney
for embezzling money from a bank where she worked as a teller. Id. at 688. She took the
money from the till of a co-worker. Id. at 689. Gwaltney claimed she did not have possession
of the money in another's till and, thus, could not be convicted of embezzlement. Id. at 690.
Under § 19.2-284, this issue would not be relevant. It would be sufficient to show Gwaltney
misappropriated the money from the general owner. VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995).
222. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (noting that in theft offense, it is
sufficient to prove general property in victim).
223. See id. (noting that in theft offense, it is sufficient to prove general property in victim).
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V. False Pretenses and§ 19.2-284
"Obtaining property by false pretenses," shortened to merely "false
pretenses,"' was not a crime at English common law.' As was the case
with embezzlement, the English Parliament created the crime of false pre-
tenses to fill a loophole in the law of larceny. m6 At common law, a person
who, with intent to steal, fraudulently induced another to pass possession of
some property, and subsequently converted that property, was guilty of
larceny by trick. 7 However, one who, by fraudulent inducement, obtained
both possession and title to the property in question was guilty of no crime at
all." s The wrongful acquisition of title to another's property merely gave rise
to civil action. m9 The one exception existed when a person, who by fraud,
acquired possession and title by use of a false symbol or token such as a false
weight or measure." This, the common law recognized as cheat." 1 In
response to this gap in the common law, Parliament enacted the first general
false pretenses statute in 1757.2
Although this statute is old enough for states to consider it to be part of
American common law," 3 most of the states now have false pretenses statutes
224. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.7(a), at 383 (noting that obtaining
property by false pretenses is often called false pretenses).
225. See id at 382 (noting statutory nature of false pretenses); PERKINS, supra note 43, at
296 (noting that false pretenses was unknown atcommon law); 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 410,
at 517 (noting that false pretenses is creature only of statute).
226. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.7(a), at 383 (noting that Parliament
created false pretenses to plug loophole left by larceny); PERKINS, supra note 43, at 297 (noting
that false pretenses was legislative effort to fill gap in law of larceny); 3 TORCIA, supra note 61,
§ 410, at 517 (noting that false pretenses fills gap in larceny).
227. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing larceny by trick).
228. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 410, at 516 (noting that no common law crime
covered misappropriation of title of another's property by fraud).
229. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 296 (noting that "the wrongful act of obtaining title
to another's property by fraud was held not to constitute a crime but merely to give rise to a civil
action").
230. See iat (noting common law cheat exception).
231. See id. (discussing common law cheat and loophole left in larceny); 3 TORCIA, supra
note 61, § 410, at 516 (describing common law cheat).
232. See 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (1757) (Eng.) (criminalizing false pretenses). The statute
provided in pertinent part that "[a]ll persons who knowingly and designedly, by false pretence
or pretences, shall obtain from any person or persons, money, goods, wares or merchandizes,
with intent to cheat or defraud any person or persons of the same... shall be deemed offenders
against law and the publick [sic] peace." Id.
233. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 297 (noting that states regard 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24 as part
of our common law). But see 2 LAFAVE &SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.7, at 383 n.4 (discussing
whether statute is part of American common law). LaFave and Scott note:
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of their own." Yet despite the different statutes, the nature of the offense has
remained basically unchanged. In a majority of the American jurisdictions,
false pretenses consists of five basic elements: "(1) a false representation of
a material present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to pass title to
(4) his property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be
false and (b) intends thereby to defraud the victim." 5
False pretenses and larceny by trick are closely related, 6 However,
despite a certain amount of overlap, the crimes remain separate and distinct
intwo important respects.3 7 First, false pretenses traditionally requires a false
representation of a materialfact.z ' A false opinion, false prediction, or false
promise is not a false fact. 9 The fraudulent misrepresentation must concern
a fact that exists now or has existed in the past.24 Thus, a statement of one's
belief about something, a statement concerning only the future or a promise
for future conduct, do not qualify as factual for the purposes of false pre-
tenses.24'
Second, the passage of title requirement inherent in false pretenses also
distinguishes false pretenses from larceny by trick.242 Generally speaking, if
The English statute, being dated 1757, is not part of the American common law
(where common law crimes are recognized) in those states which take the view that
the English common law, and statutes in aid thereof, must have been in effect in
1607 (founding of Jamestown) in order to be received as part of the state's common
law. But in some states, which make the crucial date 1775, false pretenses may be
a common law crime.
Id.
234. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 297 (noting state false pretenses statutes).
235. 2 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 32, § 8.7, at 382-83 (defining elements of false
pretenses).
236. See 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 3, at 804 (1960) (noting relation between larceny and
false pretenses).
237. See id. § 3, at 804-07 (distinguishing false pretenses from other crimes).
238. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 301 (noting requirement that representation be one of
fact).
239. See id. at 301-03 (noting that false opinion, prediction, and promise are not represen-
tations of fact).
240. See id. at 302 (noting that !'[o]nly what exists now or has existed in the past is afact").
241. See id. at 301-03 (noting that false opinion, prediction, and promise do not qualify
as fact).
242. See False Pretenses, supra note 236, § 3, at 804 (distinguishing larceny from false
pretenses). The C.J.S. states:
The distinction between the crimes of obtaining by false pretenses and larceny lies
in the intention with which the owner parts with the property; if the owner, in
parting with the property, intends to invest accused with the title as well as the
possession, the latter has committed the crime of obtaining the property by false
pretenses, provided the means by which it is acquired are such as in law are false
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a wrongdoer acquires title and possession with the intent to defraud, the crime
is false pretenses. 3 On the other hand, if the wrongdoer acquires possession
only, the Commonwealth must charge larceny by trick.2'
In some cases, it appears that larceny by trick and false pretenses com-
pletely overlap. For example, when, through a fraudulent misrepresentation
of a material fact, both title and possession pass to the wrongdoer, a charge of
either larceny by trick or false pretenses would seem proper. Possession
passes; therefore, larceny by trick should be chargeable. Title also passes,
indicating that a charge of false pretenses is likewise proper. In this instance,
larceny by trick almost merges into false pretenses.
Such a construction would render larceny by trick and false pretenses
distinct offenses in only two situations. The first is a case in which both title
and possession pass to the wrongdoer, but the misrepresentation is of some-
thing other than a material fact.2 5 The second is the rare case in which the
wrongdoer fraudulently misrepresents a material fact, but only title, not
possession, passes.246 As logical as such reasoning may appear, it is not the
rule.247 By the time the legal fiction of larceny by trick developed,24 English
law had already determined that unless the wrongdoer employed some false
token, it was not a crime to obtain title by fraud.249 Thus, under a classical
pretenses, but if the intention of the owner is to invest accused with the mere
possession of the property, and the latter, with the requisite intent, receives it and
converts it to his own use, the crime is larceny.
Id.; see 32 AM. JUR. 2D False Pretenses § 4, at 226 (1995) (elaborating on distinction between
larceny and false pretenses). American Jurisprudence states:
Although generally the subjective intent of the victim is the important test in
determining whether title was transferred, it is the actual obtaining of title to the
property that is the necessary element of the crime of obtaining property by false
pretenses. Consequently, where the victim intended to transfer title, but by failing
to comply with statutory requirements did not actually transfer title, as where he
failed to execute and deliver a certificate of title as required by statute, the person
receiving the property cannot be convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses.
Id. (footnote omitted).
243. See 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 410, at 516-17 (noting difference between false
pretenses and larceny).
244. See id. (noting difference between false pretenses and larceny).
245. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text (discussing examples of nonfactual
misrepresentations).
246. See 2 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.7(d), at 393 (noting passage of title and
not possession sufficient for false pretenses conviction in some jurisdictions).
247. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 296 (discussing relation between false pretenses and
larceny by trick).
248. See supra Part III (discussing development of larceny by trick).
249. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 296 (noting that "the fiction of establishing the
trespass needed for larceny by a fraud-vitiates-consent concept developed at a relatively late
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analysis, when title passes as a result of a fraudulent misrepresentation of a
material fact, the charge must be false pretenses." ° As a result, larceny and
false pretenses are separate and distinct.
In Virginia, false pretenses is a statutory crime." The relevant statute
does not precisely define the offense; the courts have performed that task. 2
In general, for an offense to constitute false pretenses, the Commonwealth
must prove four elements: (1) an intent to defraud, (2) the commission of an
actual fraud, (3) the use of false pretenses to perpetrate the fraud, and (4) that
the false pretenses caused the victim to part with his property. 3 Moreover,
the false pretense relied upon must be a representation of an existing or past
fact .14 In addition, it is not sufficient merely to show that the accused know-
ingly misstated the truth; the Commonwealth must prove that it was the
wrongdoer's intent to defraud. 5 Indeed, intent to defraud is the very "gist"
of the offense. 6 The Virginia Supreme Court also has held that the accused
must have had the intent to defraud at the time he or she made the false
pretenses. 57 Determining whether the requisite intent existed at the commis-
sion of the offense often may prove difficult because intent is "a secret opera-
tion of the mind." 8 Thus, courts examine both the conduct and the represen-
tations of the wrongdoer in order to ascertain intent."9
period" and "[b]y that time it had been held for generations that it was no crime to obtain title
to chattel by fraud unless a false token was employed").
250. See False Pretenses, supra note 236, § 4 (noting that it is false pretenses if victim
parts with both title and possession).
251. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996) (criminalizing false pretenses). The
statute provides in pertinent part that "[i]f any person obtain, by any false pretense or token,
from any person, with intent to defraud, money or other property which may be the subject of
larceny, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof." Id.
252. See Riegertv. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Va. 1977) (noting four essential
elements of false pretenses); Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 714, 717 (Va. 1976)
(same); Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt) 563, 567-68 (1873) (same).
253. See Anable, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) at 567-68 (outlining four essential elements of false
pretenses).
254. See Riegert, 237 S.E.2d at 807-08 (noting that false pretense must be representation
of existing fact or past event); Bourgeois, 227 S.E.2d at 717 (same); Hubbard v. Common-
wealth, 109 S.E.2d 100, 104 (Va. 1959) (same).
255. See Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 862, 872 (1878) (noting that
Commonwealth must prove intent to defraud).
256. See id. (noting that intent to defraud is very gist of false pretenses).
257. See Fay v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 912, 918-19 (1877) (noting that
"fraudulent intent must have existed at the time the false pretenses were made").
258. See Trogdon, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) at 872 (noting that intent is "a secret operation of the
mind").
259. See id (noting that intent can only be ascertained by acts and representations of
wrongdoer); see also Riegert v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 803, 808 (Va. 1977) (same).
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An additional essential element of false pretenses in Virginia is that both
title and possession of the property in question must pass from the victim to
the wrongdoer.2" Thus, the rare case in which title alone passes cannot
amount to false pretenses in Virginia. Indeed, it is the requirement that both
title and possession pass to the wrongdoer that truly distinguishes false
pretenses from larceny in the Commonwealth.26" ' Such a requirement indicates
that the Commonwealth currently views these two offenses as separate and
distinct.
For example, in Bray v. Commonwealth62 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia reversed a conviction of false pretenses when the defendant obtained
only possession of the property in question.263 Bray secured the rental of a
farmhouse through the use of a bad check.2"' The Commonwealth indicted
and convicted Bray for obtaining the keyto the farmhouse by false pretenses.265
However, on appeal, the court found that the worthless check secured only
possession of the premises in question, not ownership.2" Ownership of the
key did not pass to Bray because Bray had to return the key at the end of the
lease.267
Likewise, in Baker v. Commonwealth6 8 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed a false pretenses conviction because only possession of the property
in question passed to the wrongdoer.269 Baker went to an automobile dealer-
260. See Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 683, 685 (Va. 1978) (noting that
essential element of false pretenses is passage of both title and possession); Bray v. Common-
wealth, 388 S.E.2d 837, 840 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Quidley v. Commonwealth, 275
S.E.2d 622, 624 (Va. 1981)) (noting that gravamen of false pretenses is obtainment of owner-
ship of property).
261. See Davies v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 839,840 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
"Itihe requirement that the defendant obtain ownership of the property, rather than mere
possession distinguishes the offense of... false pretenses from the offense of larceny").
262. 388 S.E.2d 837 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
263. Bray v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 837, 840-41 (Va. Ct. App. 1990). The issue in
the case was whether Bray, by means of a bad check, obtained possession and title to the key of
a rental farmhouse. Id. at 837. The court found that ownership (title) of the key did not pass to
Bray because the owner required Bray to return the key upon termination of the lease. Id.
at 841.
264. Id. at 838.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 841.
267. Id.
268. 300 S.E.2d 788 (Va. 1983).
269. Bakerv. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (Va. 1983). The issue inthis case was
whether a false pretenses conviction required proof of passage of both title and possession. Id.
Baker failed to return to the dealership a vehicle he took for a test drive. Id. The Common-
wealth indicted and convicted Baker of false pretenses. Id. at 788-89. Thejury instruction did
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ship for a test drive.27 The dealership required customers to leave a vehicle
as security during test drives.27' Baker left a truck that he had previously
fraudulently obtained elsewhere and drove away in a Jeep belonging to the
dealership.2" He did not return the Jeep.2" The Commonwealth indicted and
convicted Baker of false pretenses. 74 The appellate court reversed the convic-
tion because there was no evidence that the dealership passed title of the Jeep
to Baker for the test drive.275
The Commonwealth argued that even if it had failed to prove all the
elements of false pretenses, the evidence adduced at trial was still sufficient
to support a conviction for larceny by trick.276 The Supreme Court of Virginia
agreed that the evidence appeared consistent with larceny by trick, but none-
theless refused to affirm the conviction on that ground, reasoning that, under
the Virginia Constitution, a defendant is entitled to be clearly informed of the
offense charged against him.277 In Baker, the proof at trial was not of the
offense charged.278 Thus, in Virginia proof of larceny will not sustain a con-
viction of false pretenses. Under such analysis, false pretenses and larceny
are truly distinct.
Despite these cases, there is some evidence of a trend toward consolida-
tion of larceny and false pretenses in Virginia. Davies v. Commonwealth279
appears to be in direct conflict with the rule in Bray and Baker that requires
proof that both title and possession pass in a false pretenses case.280 In Davies,
not state that passage oftitle was an element offalse pretenses. Id. at789. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the conviction because false pretenses requires a showing that both title and





274. Id. at 788-89.
275. Id. at 789.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8).
278. Id.
279. 423 S.E.2d 839 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
280. Davies v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 839, 840-41 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). The issue
in this case was whether it was error for the trial court to delete from the jury instructions the
requirement that the Commonwealth prove that both title and possession pass in a false pre-
tenses case. Id. at 839. Davies filled out credit applications at two electronics stores using a
false name. Id. at 83940. After the stores approved his credit, Davies purchased several items
and took them from the stores. Id. at 840. The Commonwealth later indicted Davies for false
pretenses. Id. at 839. The trial judge deleted from defendant's proposed jury instruction the
requirement that the jury find that title passed to Davies. Id. at 840. Thejury convicted Davies
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Davies filled out credit applications at two electronics stores using a false
name.2"' After the stores approved his credit, Davies purchased electronic
merchandise and removed the items from the stores.282 The Commonwealth
subsequently indicted Davies for false pretenses 3 At trial, the judge deleted
the portion of defendant's proposed jury instruction requiring proof that both
possession and title passed to him.'" The jury convicted Davies of false
pretenses. 2s
On appeal, Davies relied upon Baker, in which the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed a false pretenses conviction because the trial court did not
instruct the jury that passage of title was a necessary element of false pre-
tenses.286 The Court of Appeals of Virginia distinguished Baker on the grounds
that it involved an automobile, title to which passes only upon transfer of the
paper certificate of title. 7 In contrast, Virginia law deems title of retail goods
to pass upon the seller's delivery of the goods.88 Thus, the court affirmed
Davies's conviction. 9 As a result, the rule for false pretenses cases involving
retail goods is fundamentally different from other false pretense cases. The
Commonwealth need not prove passage of title in a false pretenses case involv-
ing retail goods because the law deems title to pass with possession.290 Davies
all but eliminates the passage of title requirement from this line of false pre-
tenses cases and allows the Commonwealth merely to prove larceny by trick.
Such a conclusion is directly contrary to Baker, in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia refused to allow proof of larceny by trick to support a false
of false pretenses. Id. at 839. The Court of Appeals refused to reverse the conviction, finding
that, in retail sales cases, it is sufficient to show that possession passed to defendant because
Virginia law deems title to pass when the seller delivers the goods. Id. at 841 (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.2-401(2) (Michie 1996)).
281. Id. at 839-40.
282. Id. at 840.
283. Id. at 839.
284. Id. at 840.
285. Id. at 839.
286. Id. at 841.
287. Id.; cf. Baker v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 788, 789 (Va. 1983) (noting that false
pretenses in automobile cases requires passage of title).
288. Davies v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.2-401(2) (Michie 1996));see VA.CODEANN. § 8.2-401(2) (Michie 1991) (describing
when title passes between buyer and seller). Code of Virginia § 8.2-401(2) provides in perti-
nent part: "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at
which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods...." Id.
289. Davies, 423 S.E.2d at 841.
290. See id. (noting that Virginia law deems title to pass upon delivery).
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pretenses conviction.29' The inference presented is that, in at least some cases,
Virginia will currently allow proof of larceny to support a false pretenses
conviction if the misrepresentation is one of fact. Similarly, a conclusion that
proof of obtaining retail goods by false pretenses will support a larceny con-
viction is probably also accurate.2' However, even in retail goods cases, a
falsepromise causing delivery of goods probably remains insufficient for false
pretenses. 293 Regardless of how courts in the future approach this issue, one
thing is clear: The Davies decision blurs the distinction between false pre-
tenses and larceny.294 Davies documents a small step toward consolidation.
Further evidence of a trend toward consolidation exists. As with embez-
zlement, Virginia deems false pretenses to be larceny.295 The fact that the
Commonwealth punishes false pretenses as larceny2' suggests that there is no
moral difference between the two crimes.297 Virginia also deems any person
committing false pretenses to be guilty of larceny.298 Moreover, proof of false
pretenses will sustain a larceny indictment.2' Such was also the case with
embezzlement prior to 1994."0 Virginia considered an embezzler to be guilty
of larceny, and proof of embezzlement would support a larceny indictment."0
This fact tended to indicate a consolidation of larceny and embezzlement. 2
291. See Baker, 300 S.E.2d at 789 (refusing to allow proof of larceny by trick to support
false pretenses conviction).
292. See Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 566 (1873) (noting that
Commonwealth may show false pretenses under indictment for larceny).
293. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 212 (noting that even after Davies, false promise
remains larceny by trick).
294. See id. (noting that "in retail transactions, false pretenses and larceny by trick are
almost merged").
295. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996) (deeming false pretenses as larceny).
The statute provides: "If any person obtain, by any false pretense or token, from any person,
with the intent to defraud, money or other property which may bethe subject of larceny, he shall
be deemed guilty of larceny thereof .... " Id.
296. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 211 (noting that Commonwealth punishes false pre-
tenses as larceny).
297. See 2 LAFAVE&SCOTr, supra note 32, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412 (noting that same punish-
ment suggests equal moral character).
298. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996) (deeming person committing offense
of false pretenses guilty of larceny).
299. See Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 566 (1873) (noting that proof
of false pretenses will support larceny indictment).
300. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (discussing pre-1994 rules).
301. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1982) (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-111 (Michie 1996)) (deeming embezzler guilty of larceny and allowing proof of embez-
zlement to sustain larceny charge).
302. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing evidence ofconsolidation
with respect to embezzlement and larceny).
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However, in 1994, the legislature amended the embezzlement statute, omitting
this language from the text. 03 The effect of the change implies that Virginia
considers larceny and embezzlement to be separate and distinct offenses.",
Virginia did not, however, directly alter the false pretenses statute. This
suggests that at least when the Commonwealth alleges larceny, false pretenses
and larceny merge. Nonetheless, Virginia law previously permitted a defen-
dant to maintain the distinction by forcing the Commonwealth to elect which
crime it would proceed with at trial. 5 In cases in which the Commonwealth
proceeded on a theory of larceny, proof of false pretenses was not sufficient.
As a result, false pretenses remained a distinct offense.3" The election pro-
vision no longer exists. 7 In all cases, it now appears proof of false pretenses
will support a larceny conviction. The result is a partial consolidation of the
two crimes.
It is difficult to reconcile such a result with the decision of the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Baker.3 " Relying on the Virginia Constitution, the Baker
court declined to affirm a false pretenses conviction even though the Com-
monwealth may have proved larceny by trick because a defendant is entitled
to be informed clearly of the charge against him."e This raises a question as
to whether the rule that proof of false pretenses may support a larceny indict-
ment is even constitutional in Virginia. If the offenses are separate and
distinct, it is doubtful such a rule is consistent with the Virginia Constitution.
However, if the crimes truly overlap, there is probably no constitutional issue.
Regardless of the constitutional questions, Baker'1° appears to contradict
the rule laid down over one hundred years ago that proof of false pretenses
will support a larceny indictment.3" If the Commonwealth alleges larceny,
303. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (altering embezzlement statute).
304. See supra Part IV (discussing evidence of consolidation of larceny and embezzle-
ment).
305. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1982) (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-111 (Michie 1996)) (allowing defendant to force Commonwealth to elect which crime
it will prosecute). Although Virginia's embezzlement statute contained the election provision,
the legislature intended it to apply with equal force to false pretenses. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 4451 Revisors' Note (Michie 1919) (noting that legislature added election provision with false
pretenses in mind).
306. See ROGER D. GROOT, CRImiNAL OFFENsEs AND DEFENsEs wn VmGnA 189 (3d ed.
1994) (noting that election preserved distinction between false pretenses and larceny).
307. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-111 (Michie 1996) (eliminating election provision).
308. Baker v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 788 (Va. 1983); see supra notes 268-78 and
accompanying text (discussing Baker v. Commonwealth).
309. Baker, 300 S.E.2d at 789 (citing VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 8).
310. Id. at788.
311. See Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 566 (1873) (noting that proof
of false pretenses will support larceny indictment).
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but proves false pretenses, it is arguable whether the Commonwealth has
clearly informed the defendant of the charge against him - unless, of course,
false pretenses and larceny overlap. The problem is compounded by the fact
that the legislature deleted from Virginia law the election provision by which
a defendant could require the Commonwealth to inform him clearly of the
pending charge."' Indeed, the legislature may have originally added the
election provision with article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution in
mind. The old rule313 and the decision in Davies314 suggest a trend toward
consolidation, while the recent decision in Baker retreats from that proposi-
tion. Just how the courts will resolve the question as presented is unclear.
Section 19.2-284 may provide the answer.
15
Section 19.2-284 probably eliminates the passage of title element that
false pretenses requires. The result is basically a merger of false pretenses
and larceny. Section 19.2-284 provides:
In a prosecution for... stealing... or fraudulently receiving ... any
personal estate it shall be sufficient to prove that when the offense was
committed the actual or constructive possession, or a general or special
property, in the whole or any part of such estate was in the person...
alleged in the indictment... to be the owner thereof3 6
As is the case with larceny, § 19.2-284 does not explicitly address false
pretenses.1 7 Nevertheless, the statute incorporates larceny through its histori-
cal equivalent, "stealing."3 1 8 Similarly, "fraudulently receiving" 319 most likely
refers to, or at least includes, false pretenses. "Fraudulently receiving' 320 may
also encompass receipt of stolen property.
In essence, § 19.2-284 shifts the focus of false pretenses from the passage
of title-possession element to the relationship of the victim to the property in
question.32' Thus, when the charge is false pretenses, as long as the alleged
312. See supra notes 172, 305-07 and accompanying text (discussing election provision
under Virginia law).
313. SeeAnable, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) at566 (noting thatproof offalse pretenses will support
larceny indictment).
314. See Davies v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding
that jury instruction on passage of title in false pretenses case was not necessary because Vir-
ginia law deems title to retail goods to pass upon seller's delivery).
315. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (discussing proofofownership in theft
offenses).
316. Id.
317. See id. (lacking precise names of larceny and false pretenses).
318. See id. (including stealing).
319. See id. (including fraudulently receiving).
320. Id.
321. See id. (noting proof of general or special property in victim sufficient in false
pretenses prosecution).
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victim of the offense has an interest in the property, a conviction is sustain-
able."z Similarly, when the charge is larceny by trick, proof that the alleged
victim has an interest in the property will sustain a conviction.3"
The result is an almost total consolidation of larceny and false pretenses.
For example, application of § 19.2-284 to the facts in both Baker and Bray
discussed above would allow false pretenses convictions. In Bray, the alleged
victim, as owner of the key, clearly had a property interest in the key to the
rental farmhouse.324 Likewise, in Baker, the automobile dealership, as owner
of the test-driven Jeep, clearly had a property interest in the vehicle.3" In each
case, if the Commonwealth proves ownership of the property in question to
be in the respective victims, false pretenses convictions are proper. 26 Passage
of title is, therefore, irrelevant. Thus, § 19.2-284 also appears to resolve the
conflict that the rule in Davis creates, under which title to retail goods passes
upon seller's delivery.327 If passage of title is irrelevant, § 19.2-284 vindicates
the Court of Appeals of Virginia's aberrant decision in Davies.
In consolidating larceny and false pretenses, § 19.2-284 also resolves the
issue of whether a defendant is clearly informed of the charge against him
when the Commonwealth charges larceny and proves false pretenses.328
Because the offenses are arguably the same, this issue is unimportant.329
However, despite § 19.2-284, false pretenses and larceny by trick remain
distinct offenses in one respect. The crime of false pretenses still may never
occur as a result of afalse promise.33 Even under § 19.2-284, the Common-
322. See id. (covering fraudulently receiving property).
323. See id. (covering stealing).
324. See Bray v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 837, 841 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that
ownership of key and premises remained with true owner and did not pass to Bray).
325. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 788,789 (Va. 1983) (noting thatthere was
no evidence that title to Jeep passed to Baker).
326. See VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-284v(Michie 1995) (discussingproofofownership intheft
offenses).
327. See Davies v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
Virginia commercial code deems title of retail goods to pass upon seller's delivery).
328. See Anable v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 563, 566 (1873) (noting that proof
of false pretenses is sufficient to support larceny indictment).
329. See 2 LAFAvE& SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.8(c), at414 (notingthat convictions under
consolidated theft schemes survive challenge that defendant is not clearly appraised of pending
charge). LaFave and Scott note:
[A] defendant is entitled to notice in the indictment or information of the charge
against him, but this means notification of the basic facts upon which the charge is
based; he is not entitled in addition to a charge that "makes a noise" like one of the
three formerly separate, but now consolidated, crimes.
Id. at 414-15.
330. See GROOT, supra note 43, at 211 (noting that opinion, promise, or prediction is not
sufficient for false pretenses).
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wealth may not convict of false pretenses those thieves employing a false
promise to effecttheir crime.33 But apart from this distinction, false pretenses
and larceny otherwise appear consolidated. All thieves misrepresenting a
material fact may be guilty of false pretenses, and all swindlers, regardless of
the character of their representation, may be guilty of larceny by trick. Thus,
with the noted exception, § 19.2-284 effects the consolidation of larceny (by
trick) and false pretenses.
VI Conclusion
The power of § 19.2-284 to alter fundamentally Virginia's theft scheme
is undeniable. Although § 19.2-284 only reaffirms that Virginia's interpreta-
tion of larceny is consistent with common law larceny,332 this statute suffi-
ciently blurs the distinguishing characteristics among the three crimes so that
embezzlement and false pretenses merge with larceny.333 With respect to
larceny and embezzlement, § 19.2-284 eliminates the element of possession,
on which the distinction between the two crimes turns.334 Similarly, with
respect to false pretenses, § 19.2-284 eliminates the passage of title require-
ment, which previously distinguished false pretenses from larceny by trick.335
In either case, the Commonwealth need only allege a victim and prove that the
victim has an interest in the stolen property. 36
Thus, larceny and embezzlement completely merge. The Commonwealth
may indict and convict all thieves of embezzlement, and it may also indict and
convict all embezzlers of larceny. However, false pretenses may not totally
merge with larceny. The offense of false pretenses cannot occur as a result of
a false promise.337 Therefore, even after application of § 19.2-284, the Com-
monwealth may not convict of false pretenses a wrongdoer who misappropri-
331. See id (noting that promise is not sufficient for false pretenses); see also PERKINS,
supra note 43, at 302-03 (noting that false promise is insufficient for false pretenses).
332. See supra Part III (arguing that § 19.2-284 is consistent with common law larceny).
333. See supra Part IV (suggesting that larceny and embezzlement merge under § 19.2-
284); supra Part V (suggesting that false pretense and larceny merge under § 19.2-284).
334. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing elimination ofpossession
distinction between larceny and embezzlement).
335. See supra notes 315-31 and accompanying text (discussing elimination of passage of
title element previously distinguishing larceny by trick and false pretenses).
336. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-284 (Michie 1995) (noting that in theft offense, "it shall
be sufficient to prove . . . the actual or constructive possession, or a general or special
property... was in the person.., alleged in the indictment ... to be the owner thereof').
337. See MODELPENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. on consolidation oftheft offenses at 132 (1980)
(noting that "a rule that a false promise is not a criminal false pretense will not be changed
merely by consolidating false pretenses with larceny"); GROOT, supra note 43, at 211 (noting
that false promise is not sufficient for false pretenses).
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ates through the use of a false promise. Such conduct must be larceny by
trick. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth may easily overcome this problem by
simply alleging larceny in every case. Thus, the issue of a false promise
would never arise.
Some doubt may also exist as to whether larceny and false pretenses
merge in cases involving a paper title (for example, automobile cases). The
recent rule in Baker that false pretenses in an automobile case occurs only after
paper title passes338 may survive § 19.2-284. In other words, the passage of
title requirement would remain in cases involving a paper title. However,
Baker tends to run against the 13 0-year trend toward consolidation that contin-
ues to exist, sometimes in spite of Baker. For example, the decision in Davies,
in which the court reasoned around Baker to determine that title of retail goods
passes upon delivery by the seller,339 stands for authority subsequent to Baker
suggesting a merger of false pretenses and larceny by trick. With this general
trend toward consolidation in mind, it is probable that § 19.2-284 will apply
with equal force to cases involving the passage of paper title.34°
Regardless ofhowthis conflict works out, the Commonwealth may easily
circumvent potential problems by simply alleging larceny in every case. It
appears that even if title passes, a conviction for larceny will be proper
because, under § 19.2-284, all swindlers are also thieves in Virginia. Thus,
regardless of the possible exceptions, § 19.2-284 will complete the consolida-
tion of the theft crimes if the Commonwealth always alleges larceny.
The primary purpose of consolidation is the elimination of problematic
procedural technicalities.34 One commentator describes these distinctions as
"useless handicaps" that inhibitjustice.3 42 For example, maintaining distinc-
tions among the theft offenses allows an otherwise guilty defendant the oppor-
tunity to avoid punishment 43 by claiming that he misappropriated property by
338. See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text (noting that paper title must pass to
be false pretenses).
339. See supra notes 279-94 and accompanying text (discussing Davies).
340. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. on consolidation of theft offenses at 134-35
(1980) (suggesting that consolidation of theft offenses will overcome paper title hurdle).
341. See id. at 133 (noting that objective of consolidation is to overcome procedural
problems); 3 TORCIA, supra note 61, § 382, at 460 (noting that primary purpose of consolida-
tion is to simplify pleadings).
342. See PERKINS, supra note 43, at 319 (noting that "the distinctions between larceny,
embezzlement and false pretenses serve no useful purpose in the criminal law but are useless
handicaps from the standpoint of the administration of criminal justice").
343. See 2 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 32, § 8.8(a)(2), at 412 ("It is thus apparent that
to retain these technical distinctions between the three crimes serves mainly to present a guilty
defendant with an opportunity to postpone and perhaps altogether escape his proper punish-
ment.").
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a wrongful method other than the one charged.3" Most states have responded
to these problems by unifying their theft statutes under the label of "larceny"
or "theft."345 Virginia remains one of the few jurisdictions that has not yet
formally unified its theft crimes. Nevertheless, over the past century and a
half Virginia's courts have leaned toward consolidation through opinions
causing the theft crimes to overlap.3 46 A criminal procedure statute takes up
where the courts left off. Section 19.2-284 almost totally completes the con-
solidation of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses in Virginia.
344. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt. on consolidation of theft offenses at 134-35
(1980) (noting that consolidation is most effective way of preventing "a charge based on one
method of wrongfully obtaining property from being defeated by the defense that the property
was acquired by a different wrongful method").
345. See supra note 23 (listingjurisdictions with unified theft statutes); see also 3 TORCIA,
supra note 61, § 382, at 460 (noting consolidated statutes typically labeled "larceny" or "theft").
346. See, e.g., Pitsnoglev. Commonwealth, 22 S.E. 351,352 (Va. 1895) (noting thatproof
of embezzlement will support larceny indictment); Anablev. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.)
563, 566 (1873) (noting that proof of false pretenses will sustain larceny indictment); Gwaltney
v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 687, 691-92 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that possession extends
to entire sphere of entrustment); Davies v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Va. Ct. App.
1992) (noting that title to retail goods passes upon passage of possession).
